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'If you go upon arguments, they are never wanting, 
when a man has no constancy of mind. My father 
never changed, and he preached plain moral ser-
mons without arguments, and he was a good 
man-few better. When you get me a good man 
made out of arguments, I will get you a good din-
ner with reading you the cookery book. That's my 
opinion, and I think anybody's stomach will b,~ar 
me out.' 
Mrs Farebrother, in George Eliot's 
Middlemarch, chapter 17 
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Why Worry About Business Ethics? 
When companies have crashed on all sides and the blame is put on a 
lack of business ethics, it might seem very odd to ask why we should 
worry about business ethics: if failures in business ethics are the 
cause of the trouble, what would be more worth worrying about? It is 
not simply a matter of investors in Bond Corp or depositors in Roth-
wells losing their money, but of danger to human life and even loss 
of human life at Three Mile Island, Seveso, Wittenoom, or Bhopal.1 
But there are reasons for concerning ourselves with that question. 
One possibility worth bearing in mind these days is that the blaming 
of these things on a lack of business ethics is really simply a matter of 
passing the buck: when risky policies do not pay off for a firm, inves-
tors might blame the loss of their money on unethical behaviour by 
the management of the firm instead of recognising that losses do 
occur in these activities. Somebody who has lost out complains 
vociferously that nice people would not have behaved as the firm 
behaved; instead of looking after themselves, taking responsibility for 
their own investments or bargaining, trying to play the part of a 
shareholder or a citizen properly by keeping an eye on the company's 
activities or on what the laws of our land allow companies to do, 
such people complain that others have behaved unethically. The 
issue of safety standards to be met at Three Mile Island or Bhopal or 
Seveso is not one that could reasonably, or should, be left to the com-
pany concerned. The community in which the company works has to 
decide on those standards, and to decide to what extent it will play a 
loosening of those standards off against the provision of jobs to 
voters, and so on. 
1 Some of the story of Bhopal is told in Sanjoy Hazarika: Bhopal (New Delhi: Pen-
guin Books [India], 1987), and a version of the Wittenoom story is told in Ben 
Hills: Blue Murder (Melbourne: Sun Books, 1989). The dramatic cases, of course, 
tend to provoke the more colourful books. 
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Union Carbide is not a charitable institution. If its shareholders 
wanted to be involved in a charitable institution (or only in charitable 
institutions, since there is no reason to believe that investors in Union 
Carbide do not also give time and money to charitable enterprises) 
they would have given their money to Oxfam or War Against Want 
or something of the sort instead of investing it in Union Carbide. It is 
not clear by what right a government of a country with no Union 
Carbide presence could insist that Union Carbide set up a plant to 
provide jobs for nationals; it can attract them by offering tax breaks 
or cheap labour or low (and perhaps, therefore, cheaper) safety stan-
dards, but the government that makes those attractive offers should 
then take the responsibility for them if they lead to problems. The 
community sets the standards _and cannot reasonably expect that a 
company will then unnecessarily put itself at an economic disadvan-
tage by unilaterally imposing extra limitations on itself that are not 
imposed on its competitors. This demand for paternalistic treatment 
from large companies (which, like the child's demand for the same 
sort of treatment, is so often accompanied by an insistence on the 
complainant's independence and possession of rights even if not of 
responsibilities) does, no doubt, lie behind some of the complaints 
about business ethics, but it is not the sort of point that I have in 
mind here. 
Injustice can follow from the angry insistence on business ethics, 
too. It has been suggested by many people that Michael Milken really 
did very little that was both significant and illegal, though he made a 
lot of money and provoked a great deal of envy. 2 It might even be 
argued that, by making possible buyouts that brought back owner-
management (though there are questions about the propriety of the 
part played by management in some of those buyouts insofar as the 
buyouts were reasonable only because of future savings management 
would be able to introduce to their own benefit but had not already 
introduced to benefit shareholders), Milken made ethical behaviour 
more likely than it was in a situation in which corporations fitted 
better to the model suggested by Galbraith, 3 in which management 
2 
3 
See, for example, Michael Lewis: The Money Culture (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1991), pages 50-51. See also Connie Bruck: The Predators' Ball (Mel-
bourne: Information Australia Group, 1988); Fenton Bailey: The Junk Bond Revo-
lution (London: Fourth Estate, 1991); and James B. Stewart: Den of Thieves (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1991). 
See especially The Affluent Society (Harmondsworth: Penguin, third edition 




and ownership are sharply separated and firms consequently come to 
aim for things other than those assumed in classical economics. As an 
example, consider this commentary on some of the dealings between 
Ariadne and Repco: 
Individually, the directors seem to have lacked either the confidence 
or the capital to have been large investors in the company they ran, 
making it possible that the retention of their jobs and salaries might 
have been a greater concern to the directors and executives of Repco 
than the interests of the shareholders who owned the business.4 
It is clear how developments of corporations in the direction sketched 
by Galbraith (amongst others) would lead to unethical behaviour of 
this sort. 5 The dynamics of corporate behaviour, whether owner-
management is necessary if there is to be the right sort of motivation 
to ethical behaviour; these are important factual issues that need to 
be examined as such, but I shall not be dealing with them in any 
detail here. 
Another sort of problem arises with perfectly sincere groups who 
insist on ethical behaviour but are over-impressed with their own 
ethical views. Henry Bosch picked these up quite accurately: 
Many diverse groups are using the idea of ethics to adva nee their 
political causes or personal hobbyhorses. They use it in advocating 
the preservation of the environment, kindness to animals, support 
for supposedly disadvantaged groups, and so on. For them business 
is unethical if it does not actively work towards their chosen goals.6 
These groups make, and encourage in others, a sort of mistake with 
which I shall want to deal in reasonable detail: they demand of cor-
porations moral qualities that an artificial person such as a corpo-
ration cannot have and that natural people acting for a corporation 
cannot exhibit on its behalf. The error is an insidious one; many 
people make it. 
And lack of facility with arguments about business ethics might 





Bruce Ross: The Ariadne Story {Elwood, Victoria: Greenhouse Publications, 
1988), page 85. 
For a simple and straightforward introductory discussion of Galbraith's ideas, 
see David Reisman: Galbraith and Market Capitalism {London: New York Univer-
sity Press, 1980). 
Henry Bosch: The Workings of a Watchdog (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1990), page 
25. 
Cf. the discussion of managers who back off too readily in the face of 'ethical' 
objections instead of arguins about the propriety of their behaviour in Mark 
Pastin: The Hard Problems of Management: Gaining the Ethics Edge {London: 
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refrain from various actions on behalf of the company and for the 
good of the company because he was unable to respond satisfactorily 
to the 'ethical' complaints about its behaviour or because fear of those 
possible complaints and his inability to respond to them led him to 
limit his actions unnecessarily. In that way, expansion might not be 
undertaken and people who could have been in good jobs might be 
left unemployed and looking for telephone booths to demolish. 
Again, when people see the government using public money to 
buy votes by giving it to firms such as Kodak, 8 when the Fitzgerald 
Commission, the Royal Commission into Commercial Activities of 
Government and Other Matters, and so on suggest that the social 
structure within which business must operate is rotten, then the pub-
lic perception is that large firms will not be able to operate without 
being, to some extent, corrupt: they will have to at least make politi-
cal donations, even if not settle lawsuits out of court. And that public 
perception is what constitutes the ethos within which business must 
act, the ethos that creates the ethics. 9 That is something which can be 
affected by the actions of citizens refusing to vote for anybody who 
seems to be involved in such activities, making clear that there is a 
community demand for higher standards. It is not the fault simply of 
business. 
So one thing that lies behind the complaints about a lack of busi-
ness ethics might be an attempt to pass the buck, to avoid responsi-
bility and insist that somebody else take the blame for the fact that 
one lost money in an investment, found that the goods one bought 
after only cursory inspection were shoddy, or whatever. That is not a 
fault in people in business, or not a fault only in people in business. 
Part of the problem might be that public perception of business 
activity is such that ethical behaviour becomes very difficult: busi-
nesspeople might well get the idea that if they play by the rules, they 
will go broke. One problem might be that some people try to use 
business to further their own ethical ends. There are many problems 
about business ethics. What I want to deal with is only part of the 
problem: I want to consider just what can properly be expected of 
business in general terms by way of ethical behaviour and, along 
with that, what is special about business ethics and how it is related to 
8 
9 
Jossey-Bass, 1988), pages 3--4 (discussion of defence contractors) and 7-9 (case 
of the shopping mall). 
Cf. also Paul Barry: The Rise and Fall of Alan Bond (Sydney: Bantam Books, 
1990), pages 149-150. 
The etymology is that 'ethics' derives from 'ethos'. 
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the personal morality we are all expected to exhibit in our day-to-day 
lives; I want to consider how it is that ethical confusions arise from 
people's mistaking the relationship between personal morality and 
business ethics; and I want to consider what can be done by way of 
education in business ethics to raise the standards and just what role 
philosophical ethics can play in that. 
I have found, in my experience of giving talks to groups of 
businesspeople, that they will often tell me beforehand that there can 
be no ethics in business. The people who tell me this are decent and 
intelligent people. To my relief, I have usually been able to persuade 
them that they were mistaken. These are intelligent people who 
know their field well, but suffer from a conceptual confusion. The 
confusion is not a simple one; those people would not have made the 
mistake if it were. Peeling away the layers of confusion to reveal the 
mistake is not a simple task; travelling along that path with me will 
require the reader's concentration, especially in the middle sections 
of the argument. Going through that part of the argument is not, and 
cannot be, like reading a light novel. But we must go through it. 
Without understanding the problem, one cannot grasp the solution. 
One thing worth thinking about at the start of all this is just who 
it is to whom writing about business ethics is addressed. One thing 
that is certainly not the case is that some philosopher somewhere, let 
alone that I here, will say something about business ethics as a result 
of which dyed-in-the-wool villains give up their evil ways, return 
their ill-gotten gains to the aged and ill widows from whom they 
were taken by fraud or duress, and go off to spend the rest of their 
lives caring for lepers. A lot of the people who bemoan the lack of 
business ethics and talk of having education in business ethics do 
seem to think that courses in the subject would work in some such 
magic way. Nevertheless, many of the tales told about activities 
involved in WA Inc., about which people say that they show a failure 
of ethics and therefore the need for ethical codes and education were, 
if the stories were true, illegal, not simply unethical. People who 
completely ignore the law (as opposed to people who first think 
about the law and then decide that it is so bad that it must be 
disobeyed) are not likely to be all that impressed by unenforceable 
ethical claims. Just saying or writing something to somebody, by 
itself, without provision of any new motivation, is unlikely to change 
bad people into good. 
But then perhaps we should not set our sights so high. There are 
possible confusions in business and professional ethics so that well-
5 
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intentioned people, people who want to do the right thing, will wind 
up doing the wrong thing because of the confusion: setting out to 
behave good-heartedly and decently, for example, they will wind up 
failing to carry out their duties to the shareholders or somehow mak-
ing improper use of the money entrusted to their care. Worse, in 
some respects, they will see the impropriety of such behaviour and 
will therefore give up any ethical concern in business or their profes-
sional lives. The philosophical contribution to business and pro-
fessional ethics is to work at removing some of those confusions. The 
people at whom writing about business and professional ethics 
should be directed, therefore, are the ethical, and that does not mean 
that we are merely preaching to the converted or dealing with those 
who will never disagree with what is said. We are writing for people 
whose behaviour can change as a result of the discussion, not for 
those who are already doing the right thing, and we are writing only 
for people whose behaviour can be changed in that way by the dis-
cussion. Education in business ethics will do no magic, and we 
should not look to it to do magic. 
What particularly interests me is the ways in which ethical con-
cerns can lead ethical people to unethical activities. One reason, but 
only one of several reasons, why it interests me is that sorting out 
that sort of confusion will help to persuade some people who do not 
even try to behave ethically to start trying to behave ethically. It will 
not have that effect with everybody who lacks ethical concern even if 
all my arguments are correct and perfectly clear, but it might have 
that effect with one particular group. I have often come across busi-
ness people who deny that there is any ethics in business, just as one 
comes across many people outside business who make the same 
claim. At the mention of business or professional ethics they start to 
make very bad jokes about military intelligence. They think of ethical 
behaviour as performing required acts from a certain list that seems 
to be invariant despite change in circumstances; if those acts are silly 
ones to perform in certain circumstances, then ethical behaviour is 
silly in those circumstances. It is as though, seeing that telling a lie is 
improper in certain circumstances, they concluded that telling a lie 
must be improper in all circumstances and therefore made Aunty 
Mary face the dreadful truth about how she looks in that hat. 
Such people, unfortunately, never seem to accept the parallel 
argument that if they ever, in any circumstances, owe me $10, then 
they always, in all circumstances, owe me $10. They recognise here 
the change in obligations depending on such circumstances as whe-
6 
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ther they have borrowed $10 from me, but seem not to recognise that 
circumstances might change other cases, too: telling a lie might be 
dishonest if done to gain an unfair advantage over somebody else, 
for example, but not if done in a minor case to avoid causing un-
necessary pain to Aunty Mary by telling her that her new hat does 
not suit her.10 Seeing that 'ethical' behaviour is silly in business in 
some circumstances, they set aside all restraint even though they do 
so with regret. Making clear that the restraints are different from the 
ones that those people regard as ridiculous goes some way towards 
making it possible for them to think properly about ethical behaviour 
and to behave ethically. It is a matter of considering what puts those 
required (or prohibited) actions on the list in the first place, and thus 
of considering the applicability of ethical predicates to business-
people and professionals. We distinguish between actions in one's 
personal capacity and actions in one's professional capacity. Of course 
one's personal morality matters when one acts in one's personal 
capacity, but does it matter in the same way when one is not acting in 
one's personal capacity? In what ways should my private moral 
views guide me when I am acting as a director or manager on behalf of 
shareholders? 
And getting a few more people back into the fold is important, 
because the numbers who think in this way or that way determine 
what is the business ethos into which people are inducted: the ethos, 
the provider of the ethics, comes from the way those in the activity 
think about the activity. What universities are, for example, is, to a 
very large extent, determined by what those in them, and outside 
them but concerned with them, think they are, even though the 
buildings are unchanged and the certification for entry to certain pro-
fessions retains its old significance. The task of the philosopher 
concerned with business ethics is not a merely philosophical task, as is 
much of professional philosophy these days, and it is not merely 
popular speculative science, as is much of the rest of professional 
philosophy these days, but it is the use of philosophical skills in quite 
practical matters sorting out important conceptual confusions. And it 
can have some effect because it is directed to the misled, not to the 
evil-hearted. The evil-hearted will not be affected. 
So there are several issues for us to deal with. One issue is whe-
ther it is possible for there to be ethical education of the mature, 
10 Cf. the discussion of complete and incomplete moral notions in Julius Kovesi: 
Moral Notions (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), passim. 
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whether courses on business ethics can actually have any effect on 
the people in business. What could business ethics do that business 
law could not do? And if business law can do the job and the job has 
to be done, why not use the coercive powers of law to make sure that 
the job is done? 
Another is the issue of who the experts are who would teach 
courses in ethics. Who are the ethical authorities? One way of bring-
ing this issue up is through the widespread and remarkably woolly 
claim that ethics is personal, but there are also attacks on the idea of 
ethical knowledge as such that would need to be taken up in a really 
detailed account of the matter. But how can anybody teach some-
thing as shifting, as difficult, and as much a cause of disagreement as 
is ethics? 'Ethics can ... be frustrating because it offers few black-and-
white solutions; instead, it offers complex problems, hard choices, 
and uncertain outcomes. In accounting, 2 + 2 = 4, or is supposed to, 
but in ethics there is no cookbook formula.' 11 In such cases, one per-
son's guess is, perhaps, as likely to be right as any other person's (one 
meaning that can be put on the claim that ethics is personal); nobody 
really knows, so nobody is incontestably an expert. And so anybody 
can set up as head of an applied ethics centre in a way that one could 
not set up as a brain surgeon, and in the case of the applied ethics 
expert it is not really even perfectly clear what would count as failure 
or as getting it wrong. Hence directors of ethics centres will usually 
be divided into two types: those who make quite specific pronounce-
ments and are accepted or rejected as partisan (as happens with some 
Catholics involved in bioethics), and those who are not partisan in 
that way and who simply_ offer pap, saying that of course business-
people should be nice, should be good citizens, and so on. The latter 
sort of ethical expert tends to be more generally acceptable because 
the advice is so vacuous that it does not exclude any likely course of 
action or intrude on the personal ethical views of the businessperson 
in question, thus making it possible to make donations of the 
company's money to the ethics centre without having to reflect too 
much on the company's business activities or whether there is a need 
to change its ways. Which businessperson who seeks ethical advice, 
after all, is going to expect or accept the advice that he should be 
unethical or dishonest or unjust? The pap offered by this sort of 
ethical expert is like telling somebody who wants to go to Kalgoorlie 
11 Pastin: op. cit., page 33. 
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to take the right road, but making no attempt to tell them, or find out 
for them, which road is the right road. 
It still tends to be clergymen or people of publicly-espoused 
religious belief who are looked on as ethical experts, at least officially, 
despite the reported decline in religious belief in Australia and the 
fact that theologically-based ethics is widely regarded nowadays as 
being discredited. This reliance on a declining religious belief per-
haps goes with an inclination to regard ethics (or morality) as some-
thing arcane that has no real bearing on what one should do. One 
example of this attitude is the student who told me that it is, of 
course and always, immoral to take a human life. If somebody 
wantonly attacks you with a view to killing you and then going on to 
kill your family and the only way you can stop him is to kill him (i.e. 
the classical case of self-defence), then the moral thing to do is to 
allow him to go ahead. 'Of course,' the student continued, 'nobody in 
their right mind would do that.' My concern with ethics here is with 
ethics as something centrally concerned with determining what is a 
reasonable way to behave, not with respectable noises to make in 
conversation at parties. The Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs seemed to take a line like that of my student 
when it said 'Ethics are morals tempered with experience'.12 The idea 
here is that we have a lot of high-flown nonsense, which is morality, 
but experience shows that we have to set about making some sort of 
a compromise. Experience teaches us what means will get us to vari-
ous ends; experience does not choose between those ends for us, 
though we might need experience of them (and other things) to make 
the choice for ourselves. The ethical part of the problem is simply 
being skipped over by the Standing Committee's Report. 
As we shall see, there are ways of dealing with the problems 
about whether ethical education is possible for the mature and 
whether there can be experts to give ethical education. But it should 
be clear at the start that there are such problems to be dealt with. 
Those problems are problems for the good-willed, and they are the 
ones for whom we need to clear the path. Problems of a prelimina .. -y 
sort, such as those that will be dealt with here, are all too often skip-
ped over; insistence on ethics then becomes just a ritual, something to 
be 'tempered by experience', and therefore to be tempered by the 
different experiences and different aims of different people. At least 
12 Company Directors' Duties: Report on the Social and Fiduciary Duties and Obliga-
tions of Company Directors (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Ser-
vice, 1989), pages 7-8 and several times again later in the report. 
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we need the tempering to be by the experience of and in the light of 
the aims of an ethical person. These prolegomena need to be addres-
sed to get to the problem. 
When people speak about ethics, they usually express the philoso-
phical views of time gone by. Not only that, of course; Christianity 
was around before Kant, and it had philosophers giving accounts of 
its ethical theory before he came on the scene, but a lot of the forms of 
today's Christian ethical thought are derived from Kant. Kant lec-
tured to his students, who then went out and became teachers, legis-
lators, writers, and so on; gradually, the influence was transferred 
even to people who had never heard of Kant and it became a com-
monplace that ethics was a set of rules imposed on us by God 
through our reason. That is to say, God made the rules of ethics and 
revealed them to us by giving us reason, through which we recognise 
the binding force of those rules. One thing to be done in ethical 
education is to remove the confusion of Kantianism. 13 Not all philo-
sophers these days, and not all who hold to the sort of ethical theory 
that Kant espoused, are believers in God, and not all of them hold 
that ethical rules are created by God, but the common position is that 
ethical rules are recognised by reason and that their binding force is 
created by reason. 
Our desires and so on are distractions from our truly moral 
selves, Kant thought; my truly moral self is my reason, and ethical 
requirements are rational requirements of reason. Kant is wrong 
about that. There are different sorts of ethical claims, and we need to 
distinguish them. Some are fairly cold and ratiocinative: if it is a 
matter of the justice of paying debts, we need to calculate just what is 
owed and pay that. It is not more just to pay more than is owed, 
though it might show some other moral quality; justice is paying 
what is owed, which means calculating what is owed and paying it 
whether one feels like it or not. Kindness is different: if a kind person 
sees somebody hit by a car and bleeding by the roadside, then he 
does not calculate what he owes the injured person and put time into 
working out exactly how much he owes, and he does not go to the 
injured person's aid because he owes that help; he helps because. the 
13 For Kant's views on ethics, see The Moral Law translated by H.J. Paton (London: 
Hutchinson and Co., 1965) and Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other 
Works on the Theory of Ethics translated by T .K. Abbott (London: Longmans, 
1963). For some critical discussion of Kant's theory, see Lawrence Blum: 
Friendship, Altruism, and Morality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980). 
10 
Introduction 
other person is in need, and he is spurred into helping by his concern 
for the other, by a feeling, not by the deliverances of pure reason. 
The good person, and the good citizen, will have a range of these 
moral qualities: will be kind, caring, just, honest, courageous, and so 
on. It is often taken for granted that the 'good corporate citizen' will 
have exactly the same moral qualities. But corporations, as artificial 
people, cannot feel; hence they cannot exhibit those virtues (such as 
kindness and generosity) that require feeling because they require a 
certain sort of motivation. Nor can the people who act for the corpo-
ration show all the moral qualities for it: self-sacrifice is fine if it is 
your own self that you are sacrificing, but it is a different thing when 
you are sacrificing somebody else's self. There is nothing generous 
about giving away what is somebody else's, as when directors give 
away the corporation's money when it should go to the shareholders 
as dividends. And that, as often as not, is the sort of thing that is 
expected of corporations when they are expected to act as good cor-
porate citizens-they are expected to make donations to charitable 
enterprises, to keep plants open in order to provide jobs for some 
people at the shareholders' expense, and so on. 14 Seeing that not all 
these demands can be met, those who think of ethics 1.n this way 
decide that ethical requirements can have no place in business. But, 
in fact, the point is one about generosity and other virtues of that sort, 
virtues that require feeling and that involve the self in such a way 
that a representative cannot exhibit them for you. It is not a point that 
applies to all virtues. It does not apply to justice, fairly obviously; 
other people can hand over the money to pay my debts for me. And 
while a manager who declines to give the company's money to chari-
table enterprises on its behalf is not being ungenerous, if he tells lies 
on the company's behalf he· is being dishonest. · · 
So one thing that philosophers can do is deal with the sort of con-
fusion that arises from treating all moral requirements and all moral 
qualities as though they were the same. Distinguishing them so that 
we can see which can be exhibited on behalf of a corporation and 
which cannot makes it possible for people to understand that corpo-
rations can exhibit some, but not all, virtues. Because that is part of 
14 I do not deny, and will have a little to say later about, the obvious fact that this 
sort of behaviour might be very good business practice. One of the points mak-
ing it an ethical issue is that it is not simply a matter of the overt behaviour, 
which could be controlled by law, but of the motivation and a requirement 
such as that directors or managers exercise their business judgement to the best 
of their ability. My point here is about such behaviour performed as a piece of 
generosity (say) and not in order to increase profits. 
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the job of ethics education for business, philosophers need to be 
amongst those doing the job. 
And, apart from sorting out those points about what constitutes 
ethics, philosophers need to be involved in the issue of whether there 
can be ethical knowledge, that is, of what could be taught in ethics 
education. This brings us back to the role of reason, which Kant and 
others thought was so central. It also brings us back to the issue of 
whether ethics education is even possible if ethical behaviour is, at 
least in part, a matter of having certain feelings, as moral qualities 
such as generosity appear to be. 
12 
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One remark that I have frequently come upon in discussing ethics 
with businesspeople is the remark 'Either you're ethical or you're 
not'. The remark is usually made in a very flat tone of voice and is 
taken to dispose of any point to concerning oneself with the business 
ethics of others: either they are ethical or they are not, and, either 
way, there is nothing we can do about it except to legislate our 
requirements and make those who are unethical concern themselves 
with the avoidance of legal penalties. If they are not kind, generous, 
and self-sacrificing now, 15 it is very unlikely that we shall be able to 
change their characters at such a late stage; all we can do is change 
the circumstances in which their faulty characters have to act, and 
change those circumstances in such a way that the actions that 
emerge are the actions that would also have come from a better cha-
racter. We should, of course, as decent people, concern ourselves 
with our own ethics in business or professional life, but there will be 
no point in trying to inculcate ethics into others. At least, ther~ will be 
no point in trying to inculcate ethics into others who have reached 
the age at which they have entered business or professional life. Try-
ing to tum the unethical into ethical people will then be a hopeless 
15 Concern with this sort of quality of character is becoming fashionable again in 
some circles in moral philosophy after a long period (still continuing in other 
circles) of a sterile attempt to reduce ethics to mathematics and games theory. 
See, for example, Lawrence A. Blum: Friendship, Altruism, and Morality (Lon-
don: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Bernard Williams: Ethics and the Limits 
of Philosophy (London: Fontana and William Collins, 1985),especially the dis-
cussion of 'thick' concepts; Alasdair MacIntyre: After Virtue ((Notre Dame: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1981) and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); and a recent book by an Austra-
lian, Justin Oakley: Morality and the Emotions (London: Routledge, 1992). For 
examples of people who are more concerned about mathematics than about the 
particular motivation, see David Gauthier: Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1986) and Derek Parfit: Reasons and Persons (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984). 
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task. The best we could do would be to legislate and introduce penal-
ties that gave them reasons of self-interest for doing what an ethical 
person would do without the need for any such coercion. 
And teaching business or professional ethics to the ethical, it 
might well seem, will be pointless: we should be doing no more than 
teaching them what they already know. If the people are already 
kind, generous, self-sacrificing, unremittingly honest and fair, and 
generally the sort of paragons of virtue one does not really want to 
mix with at parties, then they are going to be doing the right thing 
anyway. Time they spend in ethics courses will be time wasted, time 
that might better have been put into helping the needy or other 
things of that sort. So courses on business ethics, or any other sort of 
attempt to teach business ethics, can achieve nothing: they must, as a 
matter of logic, be dealing with people who are beyond the redemp-
tion that the course offers or with people who are already redeemed. 
In neither case is anything at all gained from the attempt at ethical 
education. Or so it appears. 
Passing and enforcing laws with heavy penalties might change 
people's behaviour, but it does not, at least just in that, ethically edu-
cate them. Ethical behaviour is not simply a matter of acting in a par-
ticular way because that way best serves one's interests, or because 
failure to do so will result in imposition of a penalty, or anything of 
that sort. (Ethical behaviour is not simply that sort of thing, but we 
might consider, as time goes by, the possibility that ethics is not so 
sharply distinct from law or self-interest as some writers have sug-
gested.) Ethical behaviour means acting for the right reasons, with 
the right motivation: not giving money to a charity simply as a tax 
dodge or to gain a good reputation, but out of concern for the needy 
and a willingness to sacrifice oneself, to an extent, for their good. 
That is why ethical businesspeople will behave decently even when 
the law cannot get them.16 
By the time people enter the business world (or enter university 
classes in moral philosophy, come to that), their characters are pretty 
much formed. Parents have had their effects, as have schools, friends, 
early reading of history and literature, and so on. They are grown-
ups, and they have been brought up as much as they are going to be 
brought up. Their characters are probably as much moulded (by 
family, or social circumstances, or happenstance events such as the 
16 See R.E. Ewin: Virtues and Rights: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (San 
Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), chapter 7, for more detailed argu-
ment. 
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train crash that killed a parent) as they ever will be. If, at that stage, 
they just do not care about the interests of other people, it is unlikely 
that a quick course on ethics will make them do so. 
Perhaps the good of others can be·made an occasion of their own 
good, so that they can pursue their own good only, or best, by pur-
suing the good of others;17 that will make their behaviour conform to 
requirements, but will not change the person's character and will not 
make the behaviour genuinely kind, considerate, or whatever. Its 
effect will be similar to legislation requiring that sort of behaviour 
(and that effect is worth achieving that way if it cannot be achieved 
any other way). But nobody running an ethics course will be able to 
produce a magic formula that suddenly makes the villainous become 
the virtuous, or produces in the uncaring a genuine concern for the 
good of others. Whatever the connection between ethics and reason 
might be, ethics is not derived from reason in any way that makes it 
possible for a teacher to do sums on a blackboard that make some- , 
body realise the error of his ways and correct them: those sums on ---1 
the blackboard will not turn a callous person into a caring person, a 
cheat into somebody who penalises himself in a game of golf because 
his ball moved when a bee landed on it as he addressed it. Our feel-
ings do not respond to reason in quite that sort of way, if only 
because pure reason, the laws of logic, do not produce ethical con-
clusions. 
David Hume expressed the point trenchantly and clearly: 
... as nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has a 
reference to it, and as the judgments of our understanding only have 
this reference, it must follow, that passions can be contrary to reason 
only so far as they are accompany' d with some judgment or opinion. 
According to this principle, which is so obvious and natural, 'tis 
only in two senses, that any affection can be call' d unreasonable. 
First, When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or 
security, is founded on the supposition of the existence of objects, 
17 Much of political theory is devoted to sorting out systems which will make it 
the case that one person's pursuing his own good, no matter how selfishly, will 
be productive of other people's good. Some political theories are actually con-
cerned with how to make self-interest the occasion for aiming at the good of 
others, not merely for producing the good of others even without intending to 
do so. Politics, in this respect, is aimed at making up some of the ethical defici-
encies that are reasonably common in people. (We shall return later to the rela-
tionship between ethics and politics.) So much of political theory deals with 
this sort of issue that it is impossible to suggest further reading that actually 
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which really do not exist. Secondly, When in exerting any passion in 
action, we ch use means insufficient for the design' d end, and 
deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects. Where a 
passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chuses means 
insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor 
condemn it. 'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of 
the whole world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to 
reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness 
of ... a person wholly unknown to me. 'Tis as little contrary to 
reason to prefer even my own acknowledg' d lesser good to my 
greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the 
latter .... In short, a passion must be accompany'd with some false 
judgment, in order to its being unreasonable; and even then 'tis not 
the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the 
judgment.18 · 
So if I hit you because I am angry with you, and I am angry with 
you because I believe you have done me some harm when, in fact, 
you have not done me such harm, then my passion and the beha-
viour that it leads to are unreasonable if it is unreasonable for me to 
believe that you did me the harm. But unreasonableness attaches 
,., ; only to judgements, not to passions, not to ends chosen out of those 
' passions, and not to behaviour. 19 
Hume, a philosopher who set a lot of the terms of philosophical 
debate since his time, raised another point that is common amongst 
philosophers concerned with practical reason (that is, the sort of 
reason that is supposed to make us act, as opposed to theoretical 
reason, which simply informs us of truths): 
18 
19 
'Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure 
from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or pro-
pensity, and are carry'd to avoid or embrace what will give us this 
uneasiness or satisfaction. 'Tis also obvious, that this emotion rests 
not here, but making us cast our view on every side, comprehends 
dealing with this sort of thing in a readable and useful way is Albert 0. Hirsch-
man: The Passions and the Interests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). 
David Hume (ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge): A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1968 edition), pages 415-416. When Hume says that 
'judgments of our understanding only have this reference', he means what we 
would say by means of the words 'only judgments of our understanding have 
this reference'. His claim at the start of that passage is that only judgements, 
and not passions, are true or false. 
A similar line is followed by Patrick Nowell-Smith in Ethics (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1954), at, for example, page 115. For discussion, see Philippa Foot, 
especially 'Moral Arguments' in Mind, 1958 (reprinted in her Virtues and Vices 
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whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation 
of cause and effect. Here then reasoning takes place to discover this 
relation; and according as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a 
subsequent variation. But 'tis evident in this case, that the impulse 
arises not from reason, but is only directed by it. 'Tis from the pros-
pect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises 
towards any object: And these emotions extend themselves to the 
causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by 
reason and experience .... Reason is, and ought only to be the slave 
of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to 
serve and obey them.20 
Reason doesn't move us. Proof of Pythagoras' Theorem will get us up 
and moving only if it is relevant to something that we want to do; 
reason serves only to let us know the means to the ends we have, but 
the ends are chosen by our passions, that is, by our wants, desires, 
emotions, affections, and so on. What moves us has to be those pas-
sions. To take one of Nowell-Smith's examples: that there is a restau-
rant across the street is a reason for me to cross the street only if I am 
hungry. 
So the common claim is that desires or feelings move us, reason 
doesn't. If one is to separate the two things so sharply, the claim is a 
plausible one. But the two should not be separated so sharply. 
Lucky21 is the person who has not felt, at various times, shame and 
embarrassment. These are, indeed, feelings, but not as pain is a 
feeling: they are not brute feelings, but require a cognitive element. 
That is to say, they require a contribution from judgement or reason; 
that is what distinguishes between the two, because the element that 
is brute feeling tends to be very much the same in the two cases. 
Shame involves as part of itself the belief that one has done some-
thing wrong. Embarrassment, on the other hand, involves as part of 
itself the belief that one has somehow been made to look a fool. It is 
true that I can be embarrassed by the behaviour of my family or my 
friends or my compatriots, but that is because their behaviour can 
make me (identified by others or by myself as one of them) look or 
feel a fool just as much as my own behaviour can. The feelings of 
shame and embarrassment are not independent of, or even separable 
from, the deliverances of what Hume would refer to as reason. Fear 
[Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), and Julius Kovesi: Moral Notions (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1967). 
20 Hume: op. cit., page 414. 
21 Or, more likely, insensitive and lacking in perception. 
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might involve an odd feeling in the pit of the stomach, but what 
makes it fear is the belief that there is danger: that is why, without 
being afraid, one can have exactly the same 'raw' feeling when des-
cending quickly in a lift. 
Feeling and belief, or passions 22 and reason, are not sharply sepa -
rate. That merely reinforces the point: people are not computers, and 
they are not moved by facts alone. What matters is not simply what 
, the facts are, or even what I believe them to be, but whether I am the 
sort of person who feels this way or that way, reacts this way or that 
., way, when he believes the facts to be such-and-such. If this sort of 
thing does not make me angry, then I shall not respond as a different 
sort of person would. If I care only about money, or care only about 
the preservation of rain forests, then the plight of the homeless will 
1:.1.,, 1 • · · not move me unless I can think of some way to make a buck out of 
I ,: I 
them or use them to serve the forests. 
If ethics is to be practical, to affect how people behave, then it 
must be concerned with how people feel about various things. Ethical 
education given in the classroom by writing on the blackboard is 
unlikely to achieve that. It might, of course. One way in which it can 
have that effect is to inform people of facts of which they had been 
unaware: if I do not know that people are starving in the gutter, then 
I do not try to get food to them or otherwise improve their circum-
stances because I do not feel any way at all about facts of which I am 
· .,,< - unaware. Making me aware of that fact will affect how I feel. But that 
·f',. 
'I 
I):, S· ir , 
is no ethical change in me: what I needed in that case was education 
in the facts, not education in ethics, and that was what I got as the 
story has been told. 
By the time people are old enough to go into business, or old 
enough to go into ethics classes, 23 what sort of person they are and 
what sorts of things they care about are pretty much sorted out. That 
is a matter of upbringing rather than of a packaged ethics course later 
in life. People do change, but changes as dramatic as that on the road 
to Damascus are few and far between. 
22 
23 
In case it is not clear already, I should point out that passions, here, are feel-
ings, emotions, and so on, things that are taken to afflict us; they are things 
with respect to which we are believed to be passive, things that we are suppo-
sed to suffer. Reasoning, on the other hand, is something with respect to which 
we are taken to be active, something we do. 
Cf. Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics, 1095a, on the difficulties of teaching moral 
philosophy to young men. The idea of teaching moral philosophy to young 
women was, it seems, literally unthinkable. 
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We have not the capacity to control people's character in the way 
that seems to be necessary if relatively brief ethics courses are to get 
anywhere. Character develops rather than changing in a dramatic 
way. Even then, there is a limitation on the developments that seem 
to be available to us. If I set about making myself a better person, 
making myself somebody more caring and less callous, then one 
thing that shows is that I am enough of a caring person to care about 
Y"' the fact that I am callous-a completely callous person simply would 
not care about that at all. If one wants to change, it can only be 
because one cares. The changed character, therefore, is but an ethical " 
development of the old one, and is an ethical development brought 
about by the old one, not by any ethics course. And if one changes 
because of some tragedy or some other event in one's adult life, there 
has to be an explanation of why one changed in that way rather than 
in some other-why did one respond to bereavement by devoting 
one's life to helping sufferers from cancer rather than by with-
drawing from social life altogether and living in as introverted a way 
as possible? The explanation will be in terms of the sort of person one 
was before. The basic character is formed before we reach adulthood, 
though that basic character develops further as the p:rson learns 
more about the world and what the consequences of various sorts of 
actions are, or as experience makes it possible for him to empathise 
more with others. 
Ethics courses that start with birth and end with death might 
achieve something, but that is pretty much what life is. It is not some-
thing that we can require businesspeople to go through before they 
go into business; their activities in business are part of that experience 
of life. 
What we have to do in ethical education is not simply to give 
people reasons for believing certain propositions, as we do (in part) 
in giving somebody a scientific education; we have to mould and 
train their whole personality, their emotional reactions to various 
sorts of things, affecting what they care about and how much they 
care about it. If we could change people's emotional reactions 
readily, say by administering drugs as is done with the treatment of 
certain sorts of mental illness, it is far from clear th~t it would be 
proper for us to do so, and certainly far from clear that the process 
would count as ethical education. The sort of decisions involved in 
that type of manipulative way of changing people requires somebody 
with different expertise from that of a teacher, and somebody who 
achieved the position in a way different from that in which one 
19 
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becomes a teacher. We are asking for some sort of position that car-
ries with it the authority to brainwash. 
If the people who turn up for the ethics course are caring people, 
then, it seems, there is nothing that needs to be done with them by 
way of ethics education. If, on the other hand, they are not caring 
people, then it seems there is nothing we could do with them: what 
basis would we have to work on to persuade them that they should 
care? H they do not care, then the ethical reasons we give them are 
unlikely to appeal to them or to move them. If we show them that 
their uncaring actions redound to their own harm through the react-
ions they provoke from other people, that will not change the object 
of our attention from being a self-centred person-it will simply 
show him that he was mistaken about which actions really are in his 
interests, and will make him a more efficiently self-centred person. 
No ethics education will have been achieved there, any more than it is 
when we persuade Margaret to refrain from killing Aunty Maud on 
the ground that it is Aunty Millicent who is rich and has mentioned 
Margaret in her will. If Millicent is out of harm's way, then we might 
have prevented any damage being done, but we have not ethically 
educated or improved Margaret. 
We cannot give somebody an ethical education by telling them 
that murder is wrong. Nobody who understood the word 'murder' 
and who was clear that the act he planned was a murder and not a 
justifiable homicide or some other category of killing could wonder 
whether the act was wrong-murder is wrongful killing,24 so teach-
ing somebody that murder is wrong would be like teaching them that 
white horses are white. Nor do we give somebody an ethical educa-
tion by telling them that Othello's killing of Desdemona was murder, 
or even by telling them lots of truths of similar particularity. That is 
far too particular; ethical education would have to enable them to 
extrapolate to new and overtly dissimilar cases in which, say, a newly 
discovered drug was used, or the murderer showed imagination and 
came up with an original method of committing his crime. What we 
have to do to give an ethical education in this field is to teach the 
student the concept of murder. That requires that we develop in the 
student the appropriate point of view, 25 that is, that we develop in 
the student the sort of person who, or the sort of character that, 
values human life in the appropriate way. It is not simply a matter of 
24 Cf., for example, The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 
25 See Kovesi: op. cit. 
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teaching theoretical truths, like high school chemistry, or of teaching 
skills, like riding a bicycle. It involves caring about the right things. 
Businesspeople 26 are adults, and once somebody has reached 
adulthood it looks as though ethics education is either unnecessary or 
impossible. 
So: why worry about business ethics? If it is something for which 
the businesspeople concerned are not good subjects, why not make 
do with business law, requiring the right sort of behaviour from them 
and backing up the requirement with the powers of the State? It is a 
question that needs to be considered, and one to which there are 
several different answers, or several different p?.rts to the answer. 
For one thing, there is the straight cost of it. Henry Bosch 27 has 
complained at great length of the time and money (with more time 
being procurable only with more money) involved in trying to carry 
out the work of the National Companies and Securities Commission, 
of which he was chairman from 1985 to 1990. Despite the fact that the 
NCSC had a budget of $6 million a year when Bosch took over in 
1985, and the further fact that that budget kept pace with inflation 
thereafter, Bosch found it impossible to carry out the duties of the 
NCSC properly. That remained true despite the help the ~CSC recei-
ved from the private sector: 
Three sources of help were of particular value. We were able to 
obtain some excellent officers from the private sector and to per-
suade some employers to subsidise their salaries. The Commission 
got some very useful people and no doubt the employers got some 
valuable experience on their return. 
We also received direct contributions from the private sector. Meet-
ings and functions were paid for, overseas trips subsidised, termi-
nals for surveillance systems installed without charge and specialist 
consulting services given free or at very low rates. Holding out the 
begging bowl was never a preferred option and its dangers were 
recognised, but without it the Commission's effectiveness would 
have been significantly reduced. 
Probably the most important way of reinforcing the budget was to 
include an element of the Commission's costs in the commercial 
settlements that were reached following enforcement actions.28 
26 Outside the computer and entertainment industries, anyway. 
27 Henry Bosch: op. dt., passim, but especially chapter 5. 
28 Bosch: op. dt., page 45. 
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So, in order to operate, the Commission was forced to become a 
player in the game it was controlling: taking a financial interest in the 
outcome of its cases (the last paragraph of the quotation); behaving in 
a way that raises eyebrows when politicians are found to have beha-
ved that way and would almost certainly do more if judges were 
found to have behaved that way with people who were corning 
before their courts (middle paragraph); and training people in the 
ways of the NCSC before returning them to the private sector with 
that specialist knowledge of how to evade the NCSCs clutches (first 
paragraph). The whole task seems hopeless. And when we consider 
that the objects of the NCSC's investigations were powerful firms 
that could, if they wanted to, afford the very best in legal and accoun-
tancy skills in an effort to evade the requirements of the law, we can 
see that increasing the NCSC's budget would probably simply result 
in an increase in the other side's budget and leave the Commission, 
comparatively speaking, just as badly off as before. 
There are, then, practical problems of a financial sort about doing 
the whole job by means of the law. But there are other practical prob-
lems, too. Directors and managers have to use judgement, and they 
are not infallible. We cannot require that they never make a mistake, 
but we can require that they try to do the job properly: that they 
consider the sorts of things they are supposed to consider, and do not 
use their positions simply for their own advantage or anything of 
that sort. This judgement or discretion of the manager or director 
cannot be taken over by the law. 'The court will interfere when there 
is a breach of duty, such as fraud or an abuse of power, but it will not 
substitute its discretion or judgment for that of the directors acting in 
good faith.' 29 The courts cannot be expected to read people's minds; 
whatever is a possible business judgement, even if badly mistaken, 
will be acceptable. 
Trust is needed if business is to operate, and it rather looks as 
though law by itself could not provide enough of that trust. The 
expense would be too great, and it would take over everything so 
that no time or money was left for straightforward business activity. 
There is an underlying reason for that, and the basic reason why law 
by itself, without ethics, cannot do the job. It is a reason that emerges 
when we touch on the relationship between ethics and law. 
29 J.E. Corkery: Directors' Powers and Duties (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 
1987), page 59. 
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Law is the community's requirements, and it emerges from the 
same ethos as produces the ethics of that community. Law that does 
not emerge from that same ethos will not be tal<en seriously: breaking 
the law will be regarded as what real people do; the law will not be 
enforced too rigidly; thinking up purely technical ways of evading 
the law will be a respectable activity; and so on. People who are cap-
able of coming up with business law that is fair to all, including 
business, and that makes business activity possible, are people who 
already have a good idea of what it is to be fair to all. They can make 
such a law only if they already have the ethical background from 
which to make it, and the law will be effective only if that ethical 
background is taken fairly seriously. The community can then use the 
law to enforce its ethical will on the recalcitrant or the outlaws, but 
that possibility depends on there being an ethos creating the com-
munity that thus enforces its will. 
Laws are made by people, and only decent people will make 
decent laws. Setting ethics aside and trying to do everything by 
means of legislation cannot succeed, for that reason: when ethics is 
forgotten, law has no basis. At the moment we should notice that 
trying to do it all by legislation, setting aside ethics, means setting 
aside the ethos and the community; it takes us away from democracy 
and leaves us with, at best, a paternalistic government that decides 
what is best for us and then forces its will (though, no doubt, our best 
interests) on us. The problem about ethics had better not be quite so 
intractable as it looks. 
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If my car shows signs of breaking down, I take it to a mechanic. The 
mechanic might, perhaps, be a backyard mechanic who do~s this sort 
of work on the side or as a hobby, but I know what I am looking for 
when I look for a mechanic because I know what it is for a car to be 
fixed. The same with my body: we know what it is for our bodies to 
be fixed, and that is why we can have a genuine argument about 
whether it is better to go to a GP in the local practice or to seek some-
body who practises alternative medicine (assuming that the GP in the 
local practice does not practise alternative medicine). We don't all 
have to agree that doctors are experts at fixing human bodies or that 
Fred, who treats a broken axle with herbal tea, is an expert mechanic, 
but we have to agree on what counts as a satisfactory outcome before 
we can even have a serious argument about Fred or the doctor. 
Who are the experts in ethics? Faced with an ethical problem, 
some people go to their clergyman, some to their parents or some 
person they regard as older and wiser, some write to the advice 
columns in the newspapers or ring up talkback radio programmes, 
and so on over a range of possibilities. 30 Some people, on the other 
hand, will take no notice of any clergyman, will consult older and 
wiser people only so that they can do the opposite of what they are 
told, and so on. There is no agreement about who the experts are in 
ethics. More than that, though: there is no agreement about how we 
could sort out who the experts are, because there is no agreement 
about what the right outcome is or about how to tell what the right 
outcome is. If the car runs perfectly, it is fixed; if the patient smiles 
gratefully and drops dead, he is not cured; but there seems to be no 
analogue for these tests in the case of ethics. 
30 Some, of course, set about solving the problem or take to the bottle, but my 
concern here is with the idea of an ethical expert. 
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That n abortions are carried out in Australia each year has, on the 
face of it, no relevance at all to the issue of whether abortion is or is 
not an ethical activity. That people behave in a certain way does not 
show that they should and does not show that they should not. There 
is a special sort of case, viz., what are often called moral practices or 
institutions. If everybody broke all of his or her promises, that does 
seem to have some relevance to the issue of what I can properly do 
after saying 'I promise to do X'. It seems to have that relevance 
because it seems to be relevant to the issue of whether my saying that 
amounts to my promising to do X. If nobody ever keeps promises, 
nobody will have been misled by my utterance into thinking that I 
will do X. How everybody behaves is one of the important issues in 
sorting out whether a certain convention or institution or practice 
exists, and that is plainly relevant to the issue of whether it is possible 
to take on an obligation in that institution. I am setting aside such 
cases here.31 In other cases, how people do behave has no bearing on 
how they ought to behave. That one constantly cheats, lies, and steals 
does not mean that one should continue in those ways. 
If we do not check the alleged ethical expert's answers by seeing 
whether they fit reality and describe what is actually there in the 
world in the way of people's behaviour, how do we do it? Ethical 
claims are about what ought to be the case, not about what is the case, 
so we check them, basically, by seeing whether we agree with them. 32 
Before recognising an expert, in that case, we must hold our own 
views, and we give those views precedence over the views of the 
possible expert if we use them as the criteria by which we judge whe-
ther somebody comes up to expert status. Reference to an expert, in 




For more discussion of moral practices, see, for example, John Rawls: A Theory 
of Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); D.Z. Phillips and H.O. 
Mounce: Moral Practices (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970); Peter 
Winch: Ethics and Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), chapters 2 
and 3; and Lawrence C. Becker: Reciprocity (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1986). 
I do not mean to imply that this agreement must always be something we 
check without going through a process of reasoning, reflection, and debate. 
People can check the views of others against their own unreflective ethical 
views, or against their own reflective ethical views, depending on whether the 
ethical views they hold are reflective or unreflective. 
On the need for some means to verify the alleged expert's judgement, see E.D. 
Watt: Authority (London: Croom Helm, 1982), page 57. 
Despite what seems to be an ever more common usage, this expression does 
not mean that somebody has invited an interrogative; it means that they have 
ass~ed. t~~~ conclusion in their premises, committing the logical fallacy of 
petitw pnncipu. 
26 
Who Knows The Answers? 
be chosen, I can be quite sure that the experts I choose will tell me 
what I want to hear.34 I can be equally sure that they will not help me 
to reach an accommodation with those with whom I disagree about 
ethical matters. 
Of course, we do seek ethical advice, and we sometimes accept it, 
even though it is not what we would have thought of for ourselves. 
We accept the advice because we have come to recognise that the 
person giving it does know more about these things than we do. That 
is to say, we do not follow the sort of procedure that I have just des-
cribed. But we need to be careful here about what is going on: we 
need to be careful about just what the nature of the advice sought is. 
The person to whom we go for ethical advice is likely to be some-
body we regard as wiser than we are, somebody with more experi-
ence in the relevant field of endeavour 35 and perhaps with more 
imaginative perception of people and circumstances. It is somebody 
who is better at sorting out the likely outcomes of the various 
possible actions or better at seeing what all the possible actions are 
and overlooking none. I might see the fun to be had tonight but 
overlook the hangover tomorrow; I might recognise the fun to be had 
tonight, remember the hangover to be suffered tomorrow, and not 
think of the fact that the person who wants to go drinking with me is 
very upset and needs company; and so on. The person to whom I go 
for advice will be somebody who doesn't miss out the relevant facts 
that I miss out, and who thinks that the most favourable outcome is 
the one that I would regard as the most favourable outcome, too. 
The person from whom Is.eek advice is approached as an expert 
on facts, an expert on means to the production of certain outcomes or 
on recognising what outcomes can be achieved from the present state 
of affairs. The ethical assessment of those outcomes, the choice of 
which one to go for, is still mine in a way that seems to make the 
choice of an expert a question-begging and pointless activity of the 
sort I described earlier. If ethics education is to be given by people of 
the sort we do in fact approach for ethical advice, they will not be 
34 
35 
There are frills to be put on this if one wants to be really precise. I might, for 
example, accept the priest as an ethical expert even though his judgements 
differ from mine at times, but only if I am a member of the church (which is a 
matter of my own belief) and accept the more fundamental ethical principles 
that give him the ethical authority that he has. I must agree with him, that is to 
say, on the fundamental principles, but can accept that he is better than I am at 
applying those more general principles to particular cases. 
Where the relevant field of endeavour is not ethics as such, but something, 
such as business or raising children, in which one can be ethical or unethical. 
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ethics experts but experts in business, raising families, or whatever 
the relevant field of endeavour might be. They will be people who 
can see what can, as a matter of fact, be achieved from here; people 
who have a lot of experience in the field, and who approach it with 
imagination 
In the field of business ethics, that could leave us with business 
ethics courses being taught by just the people whose activities we 
want to curb. What concerns us when we think about business ethics 
and look for good examples is not simply experience, imagination, 
and effectiveness in business, but the ends in pursuit of which those 
qualities are used, and the limitations that person places on the 
means he will use in pursuit of those ends. Imagination can be used 
to think up more unethical ways of achieving an end. 
So perhaps there are and can be no ethics experts to teach ethics 
courses. That is one fairly common view, often mistakenly associated 
with a form of democratic egalitarianism: everybody's ethical view is 
as good as the next person's. One reason given in support of that is 
the claim that all ethical views are equal in that nobody's ethical view 
is worth anything-'it's all a matter of opinion'. If it is a matter of 
opinion, so the idea goes, it is neither true nor false. 
That, of course, is not true: people's opinions about the shape of 
the world have varied considerably throughout human history, but 
the world does have one shape to the exclusion of others and at least 
most people nowadays are quite sure that the modem view that it is 
round is correct and the old-fashioned opinion that it is flat is false. 
Tastes are not true or false; if you like the taste of turnips and I do not, 
then there is no particular reason to believe that one of us has made 
some mistake. 
Opinions are not like tastes; they are beliefs about the world, and 
as the world is one way or the other in each case, so beliefs or 
opinions are true or false. We cannot always sort out whether a 
particular belief is true or is false: sometimes the evidence cannot be 
produced because it has disappeared into the past or otherwise been 
lost or because we do not yet have the methods for producing the 
evidence, or because of some other reason. The relevant belief in each 
case will be either true or false, but, because we have no way of 
sorting out which it is, there is no point to arguing heatedly about it. 
We cannot really hope to get beyond the fact that Fred holds one 
opinion about it and Mirabelle another; we cannot sort out which of 
those opinions is true; so we categorise it as merely a matter of 
opinion, something there is no point to getting upset about. And that 
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is a socially useful categorisation to have. Nevertheless, it does not 
mean that there is no point to arguing about the truth or falsity of any 
opinion or that no opinion is either true or false. And before we can 
come to the conclusion that something is merely a matter of opinion 
in the sense that there is no point to arguing about it, we have to 
show that there is no point to arguing about it. Simply to assert that 
without trying to argue the point out begs the question. 
Another line that is sometimes taken is that, even if opinions are 
true or false, everybody is entitled to his or her own opinion. This is a 
very common line indeed, but it is not really clear what it amounts to, 
or on what the right is based, or what it would be for somebody not 
to have a right to their own opinion.36 If a right to my own opinion 
precludes my not having a right to my own opinion, then it precludes 
my being obligated not to hold certain views. The right to my own 
opinion is, therefore, vacuous if the idea of an obligation not to hold 
certain views is nonsense; it would be vacuous because if all it does is 
exclude nonsense then it excludes no possible state of the world. 37 
One can imagine that a priest might have an obligation to believe in 
the existence of God, but that means something such as that the priest 
must resign if he ceases to believe in the existence of God. The idea of 
a belief as something that one adopts by an act of will is not an easy 
one to grasp. 
And a right to one's own opinion, presumably, should not be 
taken as implying either a right to act on one's opinion or a right to 
force one's opinion on others. People who murder prostitutes might 
be perfectly sincere in their belief that they are doing God's will and 
doing the right thing, but they must be stopped. 
These views are often summed up in the remark that ethics is 
personal, and that is why there can be no ethical experts. For our pur-
poses, the relevant sense in which morality is personal is that there is 
really no such thing as a moral court. The question of what the law is, 
of whether or not it is legal for me to deface coins of the realm or to 
bum the national flag, is not something determined by me on my 
own. If I get it wrong and act on the basis of my mistaken belief, a 
court will let me know that I was mistaken. The courts superimpose a 
36 
37 
If I employ somebody as an adviser, then I have a right to his opinion. My right 
is based on the arrangement we have made and the fact that I have paid him. 
Talk of a right to an opinion makes sense there, but a right to my own opinion 
seems to have no content at all. 
Cf. Karl Popper on the importance of falsifiability in The Logic of Scientific Disco-
very (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1959), especially chapter 1. 
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public judgement on private, personal judgements of what should or 
should not be done. That is the recognised function of courts in our 
form of social life. There is nothing like that in personal morality. If 
we disagree about a moral matter, then I shall think that you are 
wrong in a way in which I must recognise the pointlessness of think-
ing that all the judges are wrong about the law when we have 
already been to the highest possible appeal court. I might think that 
the legislators are mistaken and have made a bad law, but it would 
be very silly for me to maintain the claim that the law is not what the 
High Court has just said it is. Nobody can definitively over-rule me 
on moral matters as the courts can on legal matters. My moral views 
are arrived at by me, and there is no moral judge to whom I am sub-
ject, or, at least, not in this life. 
We need to be careful about the implications of this sense in 
which morality is personal. That morality is personal in that way, 
that I cannot be over-ruled by others, does not mean that morality is 
personal as taste is personal. If I happen to like the taste of pickle, ice-
cream and Vegemite sandwiches, then that is all there is to it. Perhaps 
you will think that I have odd tastes, but there is no point to your 
arguing with me to try to persuade me that I don't like the taste. To 
put it very crudely, the fact that I think that I am enjoying the taste of 
pickle, ice-cream and Vegemite sandwiches when I am eating them is 
sufficient to make it true that they taste good to me. But simply the 
fact that nobody can over-rule my moral views is not sufficient to 
show that my sincerely holding a moral view is enough to make it 
true, or even to make it true for me in any other sense than that it 
means that I sincerely believe it to be true. 
An analogy might help to show that this sense in which morality 
is personal38 does not have that implication. If, during a game of cric-
38 Cf. G.E.M. Anscombe: 'Authority in Morals', reprinted in her Ethics, Religion 
and Politics: The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, Volume Three 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), pages 45-46: 
Now it was wrong, in the list of teachable things with which to contrast mora-
lity, to put mathematics alongside the others. 'Be ye doers of the word and not 
hearers only' I once saw as the motto of a chapter in a big textbook of higher 
mathematics, and it was right; one does not learn mathematics by learning that 
mathematical propositions are truths, but by working out their proofs. Simi-
larly it might be held that one's morality must be something one has formula-
ted for oneself, seeing the rightness and wrongness of each of the things one 
judges to be right or wrong; so that if ever anyone else taught one, he was the 
occasion of one's formulating for oneself what he taught, rather than the source 
of information. 
There is tied up with this view the idea that one's own personal conscience is 
necessarily the supreme arbiter in matters of right and wrong. 
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ket, the bowler delivers the ball from a metre in front of the bowling 
crease and, as it is passing head high a metre outside the leg stump, I 
hit it off the middle of the bat over the square leg boundary, and if 
the umpire then holds up the index finger of his right hand and says 
that I am out leg before wicket, then I am out leg before wicket. The 
Laws of Cricket say that the umpire is the sole judge with respect to 
matters of fact. Nobody can over-rule the umpire about such things; 
what he says goes; but no batsman who has ever been out leg before 
wicket, and no serious umpire, thinks that umpires cannot be mis-
taken. That nobody can over-rule the umpire does not mean that he 
cannot be mistaken, and it does not mean that there is never any 
point to his consulting the other umpire. The umpire's judgement is 
not merely personal, because he has the same book of rules as the rest 
of us have (including the players) and shares with us a general agree-
ment about the interpretation of the rules, but if he is an expert 
umpire then he is expert in that he sees well, is a good judge of where 
the ball was, he is not easily flustered or distracted, and he remem-
bers all the relevant rules. It is not the sort of expertise discussed a 
little earlier, which consists of being good at sorting out the likely 
consequences of actions, but it can provide a useful model for some 
aspects of moral life. 
In the same way as there can be point to the umpire's consulting 
his partner, there can be point to seeking moral advice from some-
body. There can be point to arguing moral problems out with some-
body. As the umpires and players share a common rule book and a 
common background of agreement about interpretation of the rules, 
we all share a set of moral concepts (we operate the notions of justice, 
courage, kindness, and so on) and a background of agreement about 
their application (we can often work on the basis of agreement about 
what constitutes a fair thing). That I cannot be over-ruled does not 
mean that I have great freedom in moral matters, but that I have 
great responsibility; I have to make the final judgement for myself, 
but I have the task of getting it right, if possible, and discussion with 
other people might well help me to get it right. If what I am doing is 
working out a moral or ethical problem, even in terms of my own 
ethical beliefs, then I operate in terms of quite public and shared con-
cepts: I argue out (with myself or with others) whether the arrange-
ment is just; whether helping Maureen in some particular way would 
be kind or unduly intrusive; and so on. It is the use of those 
particular shared concepts that makes my endeavour that of 
pondering an ethical problem. I have to work out for myself whether 
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Martha was being kind and therefore deserves a sweet, but whether 
Martha was being kind is not determined by my conclusion. 
That ethics is personal means that each agent must take responsi-
bility for his own decisions; he, and he fully, 39 is answerable for 
them. It does not mean that people can act on whim, or that there is 
nothing for people to learn in the way of ethics or nothing in the light 
of which they should bring up their children. It does not mean that 
there are no moral truths or that there are no moral experts. 40 One 
thing that we might say is this: personal morality is all very well 
when you are acting in your personal capacity, but what is special 
about business ethics might come from the fact that not all actions 
performed in business are performed in your personal capacity. This 
is a point the significance of which we shall deal with very soon. 
There is a problem about whether there can be ethical experts of 
the sort that seem to be necessary if there is to be ethics education of 
the mature. One way of bringing this out is by mentioning a tradition 
that derives, by one route or another, from Aristotle, stressing the 
practicality of ethics, i.e. its relation to activity. The term 'habit' is 
often used in connection with the activity, but that can be very mis-
leading. Consider one statement of this line, part of a very strong 
discussion of moral authority: 
We may then think of moral authority chiefly as a capacity to make 
sound judgements in moral matters, together, perhaps, with habits 
of acting on those judgements.41 
The problem here is that it makes ethical behaviour sound like a com-
bination of two things, making a judgement and performing an 
action or movement, in an attenuated sense of 'action' in which 
actions can be done from habit as an habitual smoker will not even 
notice that he has lit up another cigarette. In fact, the motivation can 
be crucial. I might make the judgement that a particular act would be 
a kind one to perform in these circumstances and I might even per-




He fully, but perhaps not he alone: that people share responsibility for some 
action that has been performed does not mean that each has less responsibility 
than he would have had if he had performed the action alone. Taking part can 
show full possession of a vice. 
Consider, as a parallel following from my earlier example, the arguments about 
the standards of umpiring in Test cricket matches. 
Watt: op. cit., page 58. See also what he says on page 61. 
Cf. also Anscombe: op. cit., page 47: 
... one does not learn morality by learning that certain propositions-ethical 
ones-are true, but by learning what to do or abstain from in particular situa-
tions and getting by practice to do certain things, and abstain from others. 
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me to be dutiful, conscientious, or a number of other things, but it 
does not show me to be kind-if I am kind, my act springs from an 
immediate concern with the welfare of another, not from a concern 
about whether my own behaviour is up to standard. Hence we res-
pond quite differently to somebody who, as far as we can see, helped 
us out of a concern for our well-being and somebody who helped us 
in order to win a Girl Guide badge or to make sure that he had 
enough points for the day on his private moral scorecard. 42 The 
judgement might be separable from the action in some respects, but 
the motivation is not: without that motivation, it is not that action. 
What the ethical educator has to do is not teach somebody to 
make the right judgements, then have them practice carrying out the 
actions; what he must do is make the student into a certain sort of 
person, the sort of person who cares about this sort of thing. Living a 
life with somebody, particularly with somebody young and impres-
sionable, can do that to some extent; it is hard to see classroom 
activities with the mature achieving much in that direction. But one 
cannot learn to make the ethical judgements and then practice perfor-
ming the moral actions in order to develop the ability. One can 
perform the ethical action only by getting it right as far as the motiva-
tion is concerned, 43 so it is only if one already has the ability that one 
can engage in the practice. 
Ethical problems arise when people are evil or when there is seri-
ous ethical disagreement. The context in which I am working makes 
disagreement the main problem-I pointed out much earlier on that 
the audience for this material is ethical people with puzzles, not 
unethical people on whom my arguments will somehow work like 
magic. For that reason, it is worth pointing out fairly quickly that it is 
possible to over-emphasise the significance of ethical disagreement. 
There are plenty of ethical disagreements, and some of them are very 
serious and intractable ones: disagreements about the morality of 
abortion and euthanasia, for example, have gone on for a long time 
and are nowhere near settled. And that is an example that comes up 
considering only our own society, where we do manage to live 
together fairly amicably. If we go wider afield, it is not hard to find 
42 The case is argued out in detail in R.E. Ewin: Virtues and Rights: The Moral Philo-
sophy of Thomas Hobbes (San Francisco and Oxford: Westview, 1991), chapter 7. 
43 If the motivation is a desire to improve one's own moral character, that is a 
laudable motivation but one that might well rule out the applicability of certain 
ethical predicates. Again, consider whether an action is kind if it is performed 
to benefit or improve oneself, even if benefit to another is one's means to that 
end and the other is thus used as a means to one's own purposes. 
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even more serious disagreements that make it difficult, or even 
impossible, for people to live together in peace: Salman Rushdie 
needs to be very careful about where he lives; anybody at all needs to 
be careful how he moves in Ireland or the Middle East; terrorist acti-
vities arising from and expressing ethical disagreements can make 
life unsafe for travellers anywhere. But for almost all people most of 
the time, the norm is ethical agreement with those amongst whom we 
live. Were that not the case, we could not live amongst those people 
any more than Salman Rushdie could live in Iran. 
When we do disagree with those amongst whom we live, the dis-
agreement can, indeed, be serious; it can lead to people refusing to 
speak to each other ever again; in some cases, it might lead to civil 
war; but in most cases it is not as serious as that. We do not get some 
marching the streets with banners bearing the legend 'Up with jus-
tice!' and others with banners bearing the legend 'Down with justice!' 
We sometimes get people claiming that the society is divided into 
those supporting justice and those opposed to it, but that is not a des-
cription that their opponents would accept: the disagreement is about 
X, which one side believes to be just and the other side doesn't, with 
the side in favour of X saying that they are supporting justice and the 
others opposing it. And in most cases of disputes about justice, we 
can at least reach some agreement about what sort of thing is relevant 
to the argument: we would agree that the fact that somebody had 
worked hard all day as he had contracted to do was relevant to his 
claim that it would be unjust not to pay him as we had contracted to 
do, even if we disagreed about whether it was the only relevant 
factor. 
So agreement usually goes a fair way between those who manage 
to live together and share a culture. Where agreement does not do the 
job in the first instance, we can usually manage to agree on a fair and 
binding way to resolve the dispute 44 so that we get over it and still 
manage to live our lives together in peace. Ethical disagreement is 
important, but it can be stressed too much. 
The umpire to whom I referred earlier has the same book of rules 
as other umpires and players, just as anybody concerned with ethics 
has the same set of public, shared ethical concepts (justice, courage, 
and so on). The umpire acts against a background of general agree-
ment (not simply against a background of the agreement of the bow-
44 See R.E. Ewin: Liberty, Community, and Justice (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Little-
field, 1987), passim, but especially chapters 3 and 6. 
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ler or the batsman, but a background of general agreement amongst 
those whose activities are governed by the rules) on the interpreta-
tion of the rules. The person concerned with ethics acts against a 
background of general agreement about ethical concepts and their 
application: as we have seen, if there were not such general agree-
ment, we could not live together in a relatively peaceful way. It is this 
requirement of a background of general agreement that means that 
ethics cannot be merely personal. 
And then the umpire is, in part, the sort of expert we discussed 
earlier: he has good eyesight, and so on. He also has a good know-
ledge of the rules. But there is something else about him: he is emo-
tionally stable, does not get flustered when players appeal excitedly, 
shows good judgement about how to deal with players who are 
getting excited and about other matters such as where to position 
himself in what circumstances. He does not have a merely theoretical 
knowledge of means to achieve various ends, but shows good 
judgement 45 in his choice. Asking him for advice about something to 
do with cricket is not like asking for ethical advice from somebody 
who has wide experience of business but nothing else to base it on. 
Similarly, the ethical expert, such as he is, will be somebody with 
a good understanding of ethical concepts and how they operate 46 (he 
will be unlikely to fall into the sort of trap described in the next 
section), and also somebody of relatively stable character, unlikely to 
deceive himself simply because of what he would like to happen, 
unlikely to be misled in his judgement simply because his children 
are involved in the case, and so on. But, as the umpire needs experi-
ence of cricket before he can have good judgement about where to 
position himself in what circumstances, the ethical expert will need 
experience of life. Aristotle was right about the pointlessness of 
discussing moral philosophy with young men, 47 but our living an 
ethical life with the children will be an ethical education for them. 
The experience of growing up in that sort of environment and of con-




For a recent discussion of judgement, see Charles E. Larmore: Patterns of Moral 
Complexity (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987), especially chapter 1. 
On the formation of ethical concepts, see Julius Kovesi: Moral Notions (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967). 
Nicom11Chean Ethics, 1095a. 
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When, ... pressed by our questions, our father told us how he had 
won the cross of Saint Anne 'for gallantry,' and the golden sword 
which he wore, I must confess we felt really disappointed. His story 
was decidedly too prosaic. The officers of the general staff were lod-
ged in a Turkish village, when it took fire. In a moment the houses 
were enveloped in flames, and in one of them a child had been left 
behind. Its mother uttered despairing cries. Thereupon, Frol, who 
always accompanied his master, rushed into the flames and saved 
the child. The chief commander, who saw the act, at once gave 
father the cross for gallantry. 
'But father,' we exclaimed, 'it was Frol who saved the child!' 
'What of that?' replied he, in a most naive way. 'Was he not my 
man? It is all the same.'48 
Of course, it is not all the same; that is so obvious that Kropotkin sim-
ply tells the story to make his point. Gallantry is a quality one can 
exhibit only in one's own person. The same sort of point arises with 
the applicability of a number of ethical predicates in the context of 
business ethics. Some ethical predicates simply cannot apply in the 
case of a corporation and its activities or in the case of an officer act-
ing for the corporation. The key notion for us here is the notion of 
representation.49 
A corporation is a legal person, but, if it is to do anything, some 
natural person must act for it; a corporation cannot act for itself quite 
independently of what all natural people do. That incapacity does 
not preclude its having rights and duties, and does not mean that a 
48 
49 
Peter Kropotkin (introduction and notes by Nicolas Walter): Memoirs of a Revo-
lutionist (New York: Dover Publications, 1971), pages 10-11. 
What I have to say about representation draws very heavily on A. Phillips Grif-
fiths: 'How Can One Person Represent Another?' Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Supplementary Volume, 1961. 
37 
Why Worry About Business Ethics? 
corporation cannot be a moral person in any important sense:50 there 
are important classes of people (infants, the comatose, the insane) 
who retain their rights despite the fact that there are many things 
they cannot do for themselves and must have done by others. But 
being able to act only through a representative does limit the possibi-
lities of action for a corporation in ethically significant ways, because 
it restricts the ethical predicates that are applicable to the actions of a 
corporation. As a result, the ethical choices of somebody acting for a 
corporation and in the light of business ethics are (properly) more 
severely restricted than those of somebody acting only in the light of 
his personal morality. 
Corporations can act only through corporate officers, their repre-
sentatives or agents, and corporate officers representing the corporat-
ion can do only those things that representatives can do. What repre-
sentatives can do is work in terms of rights and duties. To make 
somebody my representative is to make him my actor or agent in the 
original sense of those words: it is to make him somebody who per-
forms actions on my behalf. Somebody can sell my house for me, for 
example, given the appropriate power of attorney: he can, if duly 
authorised, exercise certain of my rights on my behalf, and his perfor-
ming certain acts will count as my having performed those acts. That 
is the mark of the action of a representative: one person performs the 
physical movements, but the action counts as the action of another. 
Not all actions can be performed by representatives. The absolute 
monarch who employs a food taster might live longer than the one 
who does not; nevertheless, the absolute monarch who employs 
somebody to eat all his food will not last long: what was to have been 
the monarch's dinner will tum out, in those circumstances, to have 
been the other fellow's dinner, and the monarch will go hungry. I 
cannot, unfortunately, employ somebody to complete the boring task 
of swimming a kilometre a day for me to keep me fit; their exercise 
will not keep me fit. And there are cases that are not clear. If I employ 
somebody as a teacher to educate my son, is that person simply my 
50 While it is clear that corporations are legal persons, there has been considerable 
debate about whether they are moral persons and, if so, to what extent they are 
moral people. See, for example Peter A. French: Collective and Corporate Respon-
sibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Patricia H. Werhane: Per-
sons, Rights, and Corporations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 19&5); and R. 
E. Ewin: The Moral Status of the Corporation', Journal of Business Ethics, 1991. 
The last mentioned of these is the source of much of the argument in this sec-
tion. 
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employee or also my representative? Am I educating my son through 
the other person's actions? 
Representatives can commit one to various things. Somebody 
with the appropriate power of attorney, representing me, can sell my 
house and thus commit me to treating it as I treat other people's 
houses and not as I have formerly treated it. The representative, act-
ing in terms of my rights and duties, can change the pattern by, for 
example, exercising my rights in such a way as to incur duties. Some-
body authorised by the corporation to buy stock, by his actions in 
doing so commits the corporation to paying the bill, that is, creates a 
duty for the corporation by his exercise of one of the corporation's 
rights that he has been authorised to exercise. If he decides also to 
buy chocolates for his partner, the corporation can properly require 
that he pay that bill from his private funds-that purchase was a pri-
vate one, not carried out in his capacity as representative of or agent 
for the corporation. 
Through a confusion of representative and responsible govern-
ment, we often take it that representatives must be authorised by the 
people they represent. That is a mistake. As an example: it was not 
uncommon when colonies were not uncommon for the colonial gov-
ernment to appoint somebody to represent the natives and not to be 
bothered about consulting the natives in doing so. Sometimes the 
whole point of having a representative or agent, as in the case of 
somebody appointed to represent an infant or somebody comatose, is 
that the person represented is believed to be incapable of making any 
such decision as who would be.a good representative. How, then, can 
this sort of representation be distinguished from simple theft of 
rights? If I deliberately give up my rights then, clearly, they have not 
been stolen. In these cases, though, the people concerned have not 
deliberately given up their rights; they had no say. 
The distinction is drawn in terms of a limitation on what the rep-
resentative can do with the rights of those he represents: insofar as 
the rights and duties of the represented allow, the representative 
must act so as to further their interests. The representative is not 
acting in his personal capacity, but in the capacity of the person rep-
resented; that person's interests, not those of the representative, are 
the focus of the operation. If I simply take over your rights and make 
them mine (perhaps you sell them to me), then I can quite properly 
use them to further my own interests: they are no longer your rights 
but have become mine. If, instead of taking over your rights and 
making them mine, I represent you with respect to those rights, then 
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I must use them to further your interests rather than my own. The 
difference is not in any empirical mark in the situations, but in an 
obligation that the representative undertakes. 51 
The same sort of relationship holds between a guardian and an 
infant ward, to take a standard case, when the guardian must act as 
the infant's representative with respect to an inheritance the infant 
has received: that the guardian is the guardian and thus the infant's 
representative is not a matter of authorisation from the two-year-old, 
but, because of that, what the guardian can do in exercising the 
infant's rights is severely limited. 
Part of the point of the case of guardian and ward is that the per-
son represented, the ward, is being represented because of youth and 
incapacity; she cannot, therefore, vary the requirements of representa-
tion, which do not depend here on her will. The same applies to the 
person appointed to represent the native interests. Cases of represen-
tation without authorisation are, in that way, pure cases of represen-
tation and bring out what the function of a representative is. The exe-
cutive officers of a corporation are not appointed without authorisa-
tion; in the standard case, they are elected by shareholders or 
appointed by people who were elected by shareholders, 52 but that is 
a matter of how they got to be representatives and not of what jobs 
they have as representatives. As representatives of the company and 
its members, they still have the job of furthering the interests of the 
corporation and its members as much as possible within the limits 
imposed by their rights and duties, even if that duty is now hard to 
enforce. If corporations have changed to some extent in the ways that 
Galbraith suggests, 53 that merely shows that motivation and duty 
will no longer fit together as easily as they used to: it does not change 
what the duties are. An important point to emerge from considering 
corporate officers as representatives of the corporation is that it 




And again, since the representative will have to exercise judgement about the 
represented's interests, we see that discretion must be allowed and that the law 
cannot deal with all the possible problems that arise; again, we must recognise 
that the obligation is, to an important extent, an ethical obligation. 
In fact, these days the shareholders, as often as not, are other corporations; one 
gets the most amazing nests of corporations owning each other. The map of the 
structure of Ariadne in May of 1986, set out at the start of Bruce Ross: The Aria-
dne Story (Elwood, Victoria: Greenhouse Publications, 1988) looks like a thous-
and-piece jigsaw-puzzle. Eventually, though, we get back to shareholders who 
are natural people; in the end, those are the ones I am concerned about here. 
See J.K. Galbraith: The New Industrial State (Harmondsworth: Penguin, second 
edition 1974). 
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other officers are not merely extraneous things tacked on by law and 
possibly removable at some time in the future; they are essential to 
the very idea of a director or corporate officer. 
As representatives of the company-and really, in the end, of the 
shareholders-corporate officers exercise the rights of the company 
or shareholders and do so within the limits of the duties of the com-
pany or shareholders. The limitations imposed by the rights and dut-
ies of shareholders are important limitations, though I shan't make 
much of them here except for this stress on them. Nevertheless, the 
issue is worth some thought. Roughly, the position could be summa-
rised by saying that, if natural people are allowed to do it, then 
corporations are properly allowed to do it, and if natural people are 
not allowed to do it, then corporations may not do it either. If nobody 
is allowed to throw rubbish in the river, then corporations may not 
throw rubbish in the river even if that cuts their costs and thereby 
increases their profits. If people are allowed to throw rubbish in the 
river, then, on the face of it, corporations may do so. Putting special 
limitations on corporations is putting special limitations on the share-
holders, the old people on fixed incomes, etc., all those who had to be 
protected by the various State governments when the W.A. Teachers' 
Credit Society or other institutions went down the tubes. The fair 
thing, on the face of it, is that they are not precluded from doing any-
thing that you are allowed to do unless there is a special reason why 
they should be stopped-a reason that would justify stopping you, 
too, if it applied to you. 
There are advantages to incorporation; were there not, people 
would not bother to incorporate. As Corkery points out,54 it is poss-
ible to take part in business without incorporation and without taking 
on the advantage of limited liability. He quotes Street J from Re Fer-
rari Furniture Co Pty Ltd on the subject of corporate management, but 
the point applies in the relevant way to shareholders: 
54 
55 
A prohibition against taking part in the management of a company 
does not import any prohibition against taking part in business acti-
vities. But it denies to a person thus prohibited that statutory 
advantage that flows from participating in the market place under 
the shield of statutory limited liability. It is easy to take for granted 
the right of every citizen by the simple procedure of incorsrating a 
company to avail himself of this shield of limited liability. 5 
J. F. Corkery: Directors' Powers and Duties (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 
1987), page 38. 
(1972) 2 NSWLR 790 at 792, quoted by Corkery ibid. 
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There are advantages to limited liability for shareholders: they are 
liable only to the extent of the unpaid portion of their shares, so they 
might remain rich after the company has gone broke and its creditors 
been left unpaid. Their risks are reduced by limited liability, so it is 
not unfair that special limitations be placed upon them to even things 
up. But the advantages to make it a fair thing should go to the people 
who would otherwise be at a disadvantage: not the citizens in general 
(who might have a claim in return for the industry's being allowed to 
operate with no tax on its earnings, for example), but the people to 
whom the corporation owes money. And the simplest way to handle 
that is not to have laws placing quite special limitations on share-
holders or corporate officers with respect to citizens in general, but 
for people to insist on personal guarantees from directors before 
loaning money in significant amounts to corporations. 56 
Think about a few cases: consider whether corporations have any 
special obligations with respect to beautifying the environment. Con-
sider whether they have any special obligations with respect to con-
tributing to government revenue, so that they may not arrange their 
finances in legal ways that minimise tax just as the rest of us claim 
any deductions to which we are entitled. Is there really any special 
reason why retired old people living on the pittance they get from 
their investments should have to pay a greater contribution to public 
coffers than the rest of us? Consider whether corporations (or parti-
cular natural people) may employ people in conditions that put them 
at risk of contracting asbestosis, either letting the potential employees 
know of the risk or not letting them know. Consider whether com-
pensation can properly be required of the employer afterwards if the 
employee does contract asbestosis. If the potential employees did 
know of the risk, and if the alternative was that they be unemployed 
because the business could not be run with the added costs of remov-
ing the risk, does that change anything? Versions of all of these have 
been live issues within living memory. I describe them as I do to 
make my point about representation more emphatically, because cor-
porations are often thought of simply as impersonal things that can-
not be hurt. In fact, corporations are combinations of the share-
holders, who are natural people and certainly can be hurt. Even if 
fact does not mirror theory in the construction of corporations, the 
56 This does not limit the shareholders, but it gives extra protection to creditors 
who would otherwise be at extra risk. 
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shareholders can still be hurt and the managers and directors of the 
corporation are still acting as their representatives. 
Not everything done to further the interests of the represented is 
done in the capacity of representative,·even if representatives should 
act so as to further the interests of those they represent; a representa-
tive can act as such only when acting within the limits imposed by 
the rights of the represented. 57 It can be my act only if I could have 
authorised it, and I cannot hand over rights that I do not possess. 
Here, of course, is an important part of the case for making directors 
personally liable in the case of certain sorts of wrongdoing. 58 
Let us return to the example of guardian and ward to make a 
point about another, and more surprising, limitation on the activities 
of representatives. The ward, when she comes of age and takes over 
her inheritance, will have the rights to do all sorts of things with the 
money and may act in or against her own interests as she sees fit. The 
guardian, as we have seen, is more limited in what he can do. He is 
not allowed to exceed her rights in his pursuit of her interests, but he 
is not precluded only from perpetrating fraud on his ward's behalf or 
anything of that sort; he is not allowed to do various sorts of good on 
her behalf, either, because doing so might be contrary to her interests. 
And that is not simply a legal matter: the guardian is ethically pre-
cluded from such action and, as we shall soon see, is therefore logi-
cally precluded from it. 
This is one of the ways in which business or professional ethics is 
different from personal ethics: one is acting in a business or profes-
sional capacity, not in one's personal capacity, so different considera-
tions are relevant. To put it differently, if one is acting in a personal 
capacity when acting as a corporate officer, one is acting in somebody 
else's personal capacity; one is acting in the personal capacity of the 
57 And, of course, not always then: often enough, special authorisation is needed 
because the authority to make the decision about whether to seek the good of 
the represented in that particular way does not lie with the representative who 
acts. 
58 In acting outside the rights of those she represents (Investing Women, Inc), the 
representative (Molly) would have failed to act as representative and the act, in 
a very important sense, would clearly not have been that of the represented. 
Molly would have been acting in her personal capacity, not in that of Investing 
Women, Inc., or any of its shareholders, so she must personally take responsi-
bility. Others who encouraged Molly to her act, fellow corporate officers or 
shareholders, share blame because of the vice they showed in encouraging her, 
but it was not their act that she performed; their relationship to the corporation 
does not matter, since anybody else who encouraged Molly would have shown 
the same vice and shared blame for the outcome in the same way. 
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shareholder, performing his or her actions and not one's own. 59 This 
is one of the important points about which there can be confusion 
that leads people who mean well to behave improperly. While, as 
they think, doing the right thing and standing on principle, they are 
in fact simply and arrogantly forcing their views on others or taking 
what belongs to others and distributing it in accordance with their 
own private views on those things. 
So: there are significant differences between the representative 
and the person represented. They might even be allowed to do diff e-
rent things. A representative might not even be allowed to do good 
on behalf of the represented. When she takes over the inheritance, the 
ward can give it all to charity and enter a nunnery for the rest of her 
life if the mood so takes her; the guardian cannot, when the ward is 
still two years old, give all her money to charity and put her in a 
nunnery for life. But the law might allow a conservative imputation 
of authorisation from a ward still too young to authorise anything: it 
might allow that the guardian, from the income on the inheritance, 
make conservative contributions to charity which the ward, if cap-
able, might be expected to authorise if she is a decent person. 
But it is worth thinking about how that sort of imputing of autho-
risation would work, because there is, in fact, a clear principle behind 
it. And the principle behind it will not support some of the positions 
that people often want to take. The basis of that imputed authorisa-
tion would be that the ward could be expected to make it if she were 
capable of deciding such matters. Adult shareholders are quite capable of 
deciding such matters for themselves, so the same justification for doing 
good on behalf of those represented rather than pursuing their interests will 
not apply in the case of those representing the shareholders. For a corpora-
tion to be charitable, prima facie, is simply for some people (the execu-
tives of the corporation) to be 'generous' with money belonging to 
other people (the shareholders), and that is, to put the point mildly, a 
very dubious form of generosity. If those people who are being 
forced into 'generosity' want to be generous with their own money, 
then they are quite capable of doing it for themselves and exercising 
their own judgement about which charitable enterprises are most 
worthy of support. There is no obvious ground here for a relaxation 
of the principle that the representative should act so as to further the 
interests of the represented as far as possible within the limits 
59 And self-sacrificing acts have ethical value only if it is one's own self that one 
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imposed by the rights and duties of the represented. It is not that cor-
porate officers should not be generous; they cannot, logically cannot, be 
generous in that sort of situation. When they are acting in their per-
sonal capacities, asked for a loan by the secretary or for a charitable 
donation from their own pocket, they can be generous; when asked 
to take on extra work so that somebody else can have a day off for 
grandmother's funeral they can, as a personal favour, agree, because 
that is a personal sacrifice within the corporation and not a sacrifice 
of the corporation; but in acting for the corporation they cannot be 
generous for the same reason as Kropotkin's father could not have 
been courageous through his servant's act in going into the burning 
house. 
The sorts of points that have been made will apply also when the 
issue that comes up is one of the relationship between the corpora-
tion's interest and the national interest. Except insofar as there is a 
specific duty to act in the national interest, a duty which would limit 
the actions that were open to the corporation, the job of the corpora-
tion will be to look after the shareholders' interests and leave them to 
concern themselves with the national interest to whatever extent 
they, personally, see fit. If the money is to be made in the domestic 
market, then corporations will be under no special obligation to try to 
produce export goods because the government has allowed a huge 
build-up of foreign debt. 
Of course, it might be very imprudent for a corporation to look as 
though it was entirely selfish and might, with such a poor corporate 
image, have deleterious effects on its trading performance, but that is 
not sufficient to defeat the point and solve the problem. All that 
shows is that a firm might sometimes have reason to donate to 
charity or become involved in local affairs, considering what promo-
ted its interests in the long run and employing a good advertising 
agency. Or one might not even need to employ an advertising 
agency: 
Franchisees were advised to become involved with the favorite 
charities of their local newspapers-a surefire way of getting men-
tioned in the press coverage of any fund raising activity .... 
Golin concluded that such community involvement was a far more 
efficient form of promotion than advertising was .... 
Supporting a visible charity was not just a cheap form of advertis-
ing, it was better. For a drive-in chain looking to appeal to a family 
market and seeking respectability in an industry burdened with a 
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questionable reputation, the community involvement by local 
operators produced the type of image-boosting publicity that 
McDonald's needed. Yet, their early community service work had a 
single motivation: selling hamburgers. 'We got into it for very selfish 
reasons,' Fred Turner remembers. 1t was an inexpensive, imagina-
tive way of getting your name before the public and building a 
reputation to offset the image of selling fifteen-cent hamburgers. It 
was probably ninety-nine-percent commercial.'60 
As the final section of that quotation makes clear, McDonald's beha-
viour does not show that I am wrong and that corporations can be 
generous; it shows that there can be reasons other than generous ones 
for doing what generous people would do. Such behaviour, espe-
cially with a confused populace, can be good for business. But if it is 
done for other reasons, for what might look like genuinely generous 
reasons, it is a failure on the part of corporate officers to do their 
duty. 
And the interesting thing about this failure is that it is one that 
will be tempting to the ethical person, the person to whom I said at 
the start that material on business ethics should be addressed. It is 
the person of goodwill who will be tempted to help those in need 
with the money ready to hand to which he has access even if it is not 
his own. Since business judgements might differ about the effective-
ness of some of these 'charitable' activities on the part of corpora-
tions, it is a case that can really only be dealt with in terms of ethics. 
Legislative prohibition on such overt behaviour might cut off busi-
nesses from perfectly proper attempts to sell their products: the beha-
viour of McDonald's described above is not really improper and 
should surely not be made illegal. Corporate officers will sometimes 
make mistakes in their calculations and will give money to charitable 
causes when, as things turn out, they do not get a good return. But 
the same might happen with some advertising campaigns. Mistakes 
of that sort cannot be outlawed, but the concern is with the motiva-
tion, with what it is that the corporate officer should be trying to do, 
and here is a temptation to goodwilled corporate officers which is 
nevertheless a temptation to impropriety, giving away what is some-
body else's. The same sort of thing can apply with readily giving 
wage increases or better conditions to employees: sometimes it 
should be done, there will be excellent reason for it. Such activity cer-
tainly cannot be ruled out by law; the overt behaviour might be per-
60 John F. Love: McDonald's: Behind the Arches (Sydney: Bantam Books, 1986), page 
212. 
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fectly proper, and the law's primary concern is with the overt beha-
viour. But it should be done for the right reasons, i.e., business rea-
sons. 61 It might be done because it makes life easier for the corporate 
officer or makes him popular with the workers. 'Image advertising' 
can have a point, 62 but it can also be a temptation because it helps to 
create a high profile for the corporate officers. 
Michael Milken took up a lot of these points in his arguments for 
owner-management: 
... Milken pointed to the Beatrice buyout as an example of the effi-
ciencies that can be wrought by owner-management. 'Why is this 
company worth fifty dollars a share three months after the company 
decided to sell stock at thirty-two? This company spent hundreds of 
millions of dollars on things an owner-manager might not spend 
money on. The company spent as much as seventy million dollars a 
year sponsoring races. Elimination of seventy million dollars a year 
in cash outflow increases your value by half a billion dollars a year. 
The company spent thirty to fifty million dollars a year on corpo-
rate-image advertising, so that people would know what a Beatrice 
is. You think knowing what Tropicana orange juice and Samsonite 
luggage [Beatrice products] is is good enough. And so there you can 
add another three to four hundred million a year.63 
The temptation is there, but a lot of the time it will not really pay off 
for the company. 
Owner-managers, of course, might do all sorts of things with 
their money, just as shareholders might when their dividends arrive. 
Owner-managers might choose to give large amounts of money to 
charity or whatever. But there is no problem about that: the owner-
manager is acting for himself, not for somebody else. If he is giving 
away his own money (or whatever), then it is his own self that is 
being sacrificed. The problem is likely to arise if a company goes pub-
lic and the previous owners treat that as merely a way of raising 
money, not as something changing the nature of their job (if they 
remain as corporate officers) to one representing the interests of 
shareholders. There are sometimes suggestions that the previous 




Cf. The views of one judge: 'there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are 
required for the benefit of the company.' Bowen LJ, quoted in J.F. Corkery: 
Directors' Powers and Duties (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1987), page 59. 
BondCorp went in for a good deal of image advertising after the furore about 
its use of Cook Islands, and that was probably justified in commercial terms. 
Connie Bruck: The Predators' Ball (Melbourne: Information Australia Group, 
1988), page 273. 
47 
Why Worry About Business Ethics? 
after going public. Rupert Henderson's farewell speech at Fairfax 
might serve as raising some of the points in a quite deliberate way: 
The formation of the public company nine years ago was the inevit-
able consequence of growth. It had to come, but with it came a num-
ber of subtle and quite inescapable changes.... One regrettable 
consequence, and the one that added enormously to my worries, 
was that it changed the ownership and the final responsibility from 
a family to a large and impersonal group of shareholders. The Fair-
faxes cannot own a public company. They can and do control it. But 
they are not the owners and in law are just as subject to restraint and 
are as responsible to the shareholders as you or I. This of course is 
very difficult to adjust oneself to. Frankly I haven't. Equally I don't 
think the chairman has .... 64 
So problems arise from a failure to recognise that corporate offi-
cers are, standardly, acting in a representative capacity. This is not 
just a failure on the part of the corporate officers: it is a failure on the 
part of the general public, too. Banks, for example, are regarded as 
some sort of charitable institution and not as businesses. A bank is 
regarded as something quite impersonal, not at all as the share-
holders behind it, and then seems to be confused with the State wel-
fare system as it is required to do all sorts of nice things for its custo-
mers on other than commercial grounds. Perhaps these things should 
be done for those people, but, on the face of it, they should be done 
by the community as a whole through its taxation system and not by 
imposing a special burden on those (superannuation funds, retired 
people, etc.) who hold shares in banks. Standing back and insisting 
that somebody else ( a certain group of shareholders) bear the burden 
is refusing to carry one's own fair share. 
No attempt is usually even made to find out whether those who 
benefit from the banks' activities are poor and in need of them. There 
are charitable institutions to which people give money when they 
want to give money to charitable institutions; when they buy shares 
in a bank, they are doing something different. If banks are turned 
into charitable institutions, people will cease to invest in them and 
there will be no banks from which people can borrow money. The 
requirements often made of banks by the general public suggest a 
very one-sided view of business ethics as simply a matter of suiting 
64 Quoted in James Fairfax: My Regards to Broadway: A Memoir (Sydney: Angus 
and Robertson, 1991), page 84. Cf. also the suggestion that Alan Bond failed to 
recognise the significance of BondCorp's becoming a public company in 
Terence Maher: Bond (Melbourne: William Heinemann, 1990), page 157. 
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the interests of the customer in every way, and business cannot 
operate like that. 
There have been times when people, even those whose main inte-
rest in banks was the interest returned on their savings, understood 
how banks worked and were surprised if the interest rates were too 
high. One rarely sees these days comments like those of John White-
head to Edwin Bowring in his letter of 17th April 1875: 'The Banks in 
Sydney and New Zealand are giving 7 pr cent for money deposits 2 
years and 6 at one year. Where are the dividends to come from?' 65 
Nowadays, the depositors' only concern would be with getting the 
interest rates higher, and the general public shows no awareness of 
the issue of dividends. 
Complaints that banks or other corporations are impersonal and 
treat consumers like numbers, with no human concern but concerned 
only about profits, are unfair. Corporations treat customers like cus-
tomers. Customers who think of the corporation that way and com-
plain of being treated as customers are treating the shareholders as 
nothing more than faceless and forgotten providers of funds. 
Business is expected, often enough, to take all the responsibility. 
If a bank loans more to somebody than he can repay, then it has 
made a mistake and is responsible to its shareholders for that mis-
take. The idea now seems to be spreading that the bank is also res-
ponsible for the customer's mistake and should be made to bear all the 
loss for that, too. This is a picture of citizens as infants who need to be 
cared for and answered for by their parents all the time, not of adults 
who can have a democracy. 
That ethos makes business activities very difficult indeed. If busi-
ness is to operate properly, education in business ethics is needed for 
the whole community, not just for businesspeople. It is the commu-
nity at large, not merely the businesspeople in it, that creates the 
ethos in which business must operate and that constitutes the ethics 
of business. People need to develop proper expectations of business, 
an ethos in which business can operate without fudging. Working on 
the assumption that one should pay for the materials and time for 
labour, but expecting the business somehow to absorb research costs, 
and expecting it also to make huge donations to charities is simply 
confused: businesses cannot do that sort of thing any more than gov-
ernments can reduce taxation and increase welfare spending. 
65 F.A. Vernon and M.N. Sprod: The Whitehead Letters: Tasmanian Society and Poli-
tics 1871-1882 (Hobart: Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 1991), page 
83. 
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here 67 was formed to make money. If a bunch of people with money 
to spare decided that they wanted to help the needy and to form a 
company with that end, they could do so, but it would be a different 
sort of company. 
So people get the idea that business lacks heart; that it has no 
concern for the well-being of others; that it lacks generosity and is, in 
fact and in general, selfish; and that it is a crass and uncultivated 
activity concerned only with money. In fact, business also produces 
and distributes the food, clothing, housing, medicines, and so on that 
the needy need. It does not produce only monogrammed toilet rolls 
and plaster models of ducks. Perhaps it should be borne in mind, too, 
that art is as much a business as any other; the people in it, when they 
fail to produce a product that anybody wants to buy, complain 
bitterly that the customer is wrong again and seek to be kept in busi-
ness by the provision of money extracted forcibly from the tax-
payer.68 People have a confused and limited idea of how business 
operates, and a confused and limited idea of how ethical predicates 
apply in business. 
The corporation itself, as opposed to its officers, has no feelings; 
you can make the managing director scream in pain by jumping on 
his toe, but you cannot make the corporation scream in pain by jump-
ing on its toe. A corporation cannot have the sorts of feelings (desires, 
etc.) that are involved in selfishness, so the corporation itself, literally, 
cannot be selfish. The corporation's officers are acting on behalf of the 
corporation and its members, the shareholders-given the nature of 
representation, the relevant acts of the officers are acts of the share-
holders. So the question is: are the shareholders selfish? No doubt 
some of them are, but the appropriate response to that, if one is to 
make life hard for anybody, is to make life hard for those particular 
selfish ones and to show that Marie of 64 Dagmar St Shenton Park is 
a selfish and nasty person. One needs then to go ahead and show that 
67 
68 
There are, of course, many other sorts with different points: Greenpeace, 
Oxfam, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Edith Cowan University, and 
so on. The ethical problems they raise are usually of a different sort because 
they have a different sort of point from the point of BHP or CRA, and the prob-
lems they raise are not usually thought of as problems of business ethics. Never-
theless, some of the alleged problems in business ethics nowadays, when busi-
nesses are accused of lacking heart or being selfish, consist of picking on, say, 
BHP or a company with a similar point, and complaining that it is not, say, 
Oxfam, and that is simply silly. For a start, if all business suddenly became 
Oxfam, there would be nothing for Oxfam to distribute. 
This example has come to be followed by many other industries, including 
amateur athletics. 
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one's own moral position is superior, that Marie really does owe the 
people of Kalgoorlie a kindergarten and should be donating her 
money to that cause rather than spending it on a holiday for the kids 
or food for herself or whatever. Once one gets down to this picture 
and thinks about how ethical predicates really do apply, it is difficult 
to make out any general claim about selfishness of corporations. A 
claim that it is necessarily selfish to invest in a corporation rather 
than donate the money to the Cats' Home or something of the sort is 
most implausible-in investing in a corporation one might be creat-
ing jobs for others, trying to make sure that one will not be a burden 
on the state in one's old age, or any other of a number of perfectly 
proper things. 
So the point about generosity and the inapplicability of that con-
cept to a corporation's activities is an important one: it reflects a com-
mon misunderstanding of corporations as selfish, money-grubbing, 
unfeeling entities. Confused and improper expectations of business 
lead to cynicism that makes things even worse: the ethos of business 
becomes one of low expectations, in which case some upright and 
decent people will be put off entering business, thus making things 
worse still. 69 It is important that some ethical concepts that are 
important in personal morality do not apply in business ethics, but 
one should not allow confusion to lead one to the conclusion that 
there can be no ethics in business. 
Other ethical predicates, plainly, do apply in business, and they 
should not be thrown out along with the bath water. One of the cru-
cial predicates, plainly applicable and central to the provision of trust 
in business and the proper operations of the market, is honesty, and 
dishonesty is one of the main things that have been complained 
about in business of recent years. Lack of generosity is what people 
complain about when they want to get something out of business or 
69 I should stress again something I mentioned at the start of all this: I am addres-
sing those concerned about ethics, and that is why my argument takes this 
form. I do not intend to suggest that there are no unethical people in business 
(or elsewhere). There are, and they are a significant part of the problem, but 
they are not a part of the problem that can be dealt with directly by a concern 
with business ethics. It takes legislation to stop those people in the short term. 
In the long term, if the confusions I am picking out were avoided and the 
expectations of business changed, so that the ethos in which business operates 
changed, decent people who nowadays avoid business would cease to do so 
and, with more decent people in business and a different ethos, it would be 
harder to do business in an unethical way. One's misbehaviour would be taken 
seriously, people would not do business with one because they had the option 
of doing business with decent people, and ethical behaviour would become 
good policy even for the unethical. 
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when they reflect on ethics and think of it as something to which 
altruism rather than fairness is central, but lack of honesty is what 
people still complain about when they look back, feeling badly done 
by, and complain with nothing to gain personally from doing so. As 
an example, consider what Henry Bosch says: 
Perhaps the most common practice has been the use of 'creative 
accounting', which might better be called 'cosmetic accounting', to 
present company results in a favourable light. Examples include 
treating capital gains as operating profits while (sometimes in the 
same report) treating capital losses as extraordinaries; equity 
accounting the earnings of associates when no significant influence 
has been exercised over them; the use of off-balance-sheet and trust 
structures to conceal financial problems; some uses of debt defeas-
ance techniques; and the generation of 'profits' by the sale of assets 
from one associate to another within a group. All of these practices 
and many more have been used to inflate profits, particularly those 
of paper entrepreneurs. 
Less common, but no less misleading, has been the use of secret put 
and call option arrangements to reverse transactions. Some opera-
tors have announced large sales with remarkable profit margins but 
have not announced that the transactions can be reversed at the 
option of the 'buyer' by an arrangement entered into as part of the 
deal. A variant of this is specifically to arrange that the transaction 
will be reversed after the balance date of the first company, giving it 
an apparent benefit at its reporting time without imposing cost or 
risk on the second company. Some companies have reported large 
profits as a result of selling assets from company to company within 
their groups at higher and higher prices. The use of associated enti-
ties in different countries with different balance dates has allowed 
the presentation of even more attractive results. In a further variant, 
bad or doubtful debts have been 'bought' from a company just 
before balance date by associated companies financed by the first 
company through two-dollar companies created for the purpose.7° 
These are all forms of dishonesty, and examples come to mind 
fairly readily. People who make the mistaken and illogical move 
from the recognition that not all ethical predicates can apply to busi-
ness activities to the conclusion that none can apply might be led to 
think that these are proper business activities. Such activities are 
distasteful, no doubt, they might say, but that's business. In fact, such 
70 Henry Bosch: The Workings of a Watchdog (Melbourne: William Heinemann, 
1990), page 29. 
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notions as honesty and dishonesty do apply, and the limitations 
placed on a representative's actions by the requirement that he do 
nothing that the represented have not a right to do places ethical limi-
tations on his activities in the same way as the context of the pro-
fession of law or medicine places ethical limitations on what a lawyer 
or doctor can properly do. Confusion about these things can remove 
the trust required for business activity to go on. 71 
Consider this account of activities: 
The sale of Solarguard to Impala enabled the directors of Ariadne to 
write an extraordinary profit of $8,220,120 into the accounts for the 
year to 30 June 1983. The auditors, Ernst and Whinney, promptly 
wrote it out. Their grounds were, firstly, that none of the considera-
tion for the sale was received by the end of the financial year. Fur-
ther, argued A.H.W. Anderson, Ernst and Whinney's Brisbane part-
ner, as the previously listed shares of Impala had been suspended 
from 22 July to 22 October 1983, the value of the shares at 30 June, 
which comprised much of the consideration and hence the profit, 
was uncertain. He might have added that this was particularly so 
with a takeover bid from the vendors on the table. Mr Anderson 
made two other points: the cash was to come from a share placing 
by Impala sometime in the future-in fact on 13 October-and, as 
Ariadne, through its holding in Impala, had a substantial continuing 
indirect interest in the business that had been sold, how much of a 
sale had there actually been? 
The latter point particularly infuriated Judge, who countered that 
the value of Ariadne's interest in Impala was being disregarded by 
the auditors in the consolidated balance sheet. He found lawyers to 
support his view and insisted that the profit be taken into accounts. 
Ernst and Whinney insisted on a very heavy qualification to Ari-
adne's 1983 accounts stating that they 'are not properly drawn up in 
accordance with the provisions of the Companies Code .... ' Worse, 
they maintained that, if this disputed profit were to be excluded 
from 1983 profits, Ariadne would show a loss for the year of 
$6,190,860 instead of the profit of $2,029,260 declared to the world 
and used ever since in the promotion of its record .... 
71 As an indication of the importance of ethical behaviour to business activity, 
note that Bosch defines the ethical in terms of its effects on the market: 
I shall therefore consider 'ethical' those generally applicable forms of beha-
viour that create confidence in the markets and maintain the reputation of 
participants ... On this analysis behaviour is unethical if it undermines the 
integrity or reputation of markets, industries or professions. 
(Bosch: op. cit., page 25.) 
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Bruce Judge had the audacity to state, on the first page of his chair-
man's report for 1983, 'Directors believe the group to be one of the 
few public companies in Australia to have accounted for its balance 
sheet items on the conservative realisation level applicable in the 
present recessionary phase of our country's economy.' 
... The auditors the following year were Arthur Andersen and Com-
pany. 72 
Note that Judge was able to get legal support for his views about 
some of the matters involved, but there can be no doubt that relevant 
information was held back from the shareholders. 
In this, we see some of the problems that arise at an institutional 
level. Auditors have the job of reporting to the shareholders, but they 
are chosen by and paid by corporate officers. Placing qualifications, 
giving information that is not helpful to the officers and might have 
been withheld, generally doing the job properly in circumstances that 
are not favourable to the corporate officers: these things make it quite 
likely that the auditors will lose work. Some sort of independence for 
auditors might help to improve business ethics by making dishonesty 
harder to get away with. 73 A return to owner-management might do 
so, too, if only because the people who pay the auditor are then the 
people to whom the auditor reports. 
And again, in accounting, the issue is not quite as simple as it 
might be thought to be. Accountancy is not a perfectly straightfor-
ward business with no room for originality; standards and practices 
change from time to time, and usually for good reasons. Consider 
this account of some activities at McDonald's when the company was 
trying to raise loans: 
The fact that Boylan's accounting did not square with GAAP [gene-
rally accepted accounting principles] did not bother Sonneborn. It 
was the financiers-not the accountants-whom he was trying to 
impress. 
McDonald's, of course, disclosed its accounting changes, but the 
numbers they produced on the bottom line of the income statement 
were far more prominent than the footnotes that detailed the novel 
accounting Boylan used. 'We fully disclosed everything in the foot-
notes,' explains Gerry Newman, McDonald's senior executive vice 
72 Bruce Ross: The Ariadne Story (Elwood, Victoria: Greenhouse Publications, 
1988), pages 36-37. 
73 The position of auditors might be strengthened if the big sharebuying institu-
tions stated a preference for the shares of firms that used auditors employed by 
the institutions themselves. 
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president and chief accounting officer. 'Our numbers were funny 
numbers, but without them we never would have gotten the loans 
to expand, because we didn't have real profits.' Boylan disagrees 
strongly with that assessment. 'Every number in our financial state-
ments was fully explained and supported by accounting principle,' 
he argues. 'There was nothing funny about them. Funny numbers 
are imaginary numbers, and our numbers were not imaginary.' 
Boylan's work was not a violation of basic accounting concepts, 
just a deviation from standard practices. In fact, all his changes were 
rationalized using longstanding accounting philosophy, and years 
later some of his innovations began to make sense to other accoun-
tants as well. Indeed, a couple were finally adopted as generally 
accepted principles of accounting, including his capitalization of 
interest on construction debts. 74 
This says very little for Gerry Newman, who was quite prepared to 
operate with what he regarded as funny numbers. Nevertheless, the 
fact that some of these innovative procedures later became generally 
accepted principles of accounting suggests that creative accounting 
can be good accounting; it can notice and set out more accurately 
things that have not been noticed before. And that, again, suggests 
the difficulty of legislating to block off what is dishonest without also 
ruling out all sorts of worthwhile advances. It suggests the 
importance of ethics for business. 
74 John F. Love: op. cit., pages 174-175. 
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Ethics is important to business. For one thin~ it is important to busi-
ness for commercial reasons. Honesty, as we have seen, will pay. Cer-
tainly, discovered dishonesty will not pay, and the costs of making 
sure, really sure, that regular dishonesty is not discovered would be 
prohibitive-they would be sufficiently high to make honesty a good 
investment. That one refrains from confused displays of 'generosity' 
and can therefore put one's product on the market cheaper is 
unlikely to hurt one's capacity to sell. If ethical behaviour is the norm 
in business, then all the costs of legislation and enforcement, which 
are likely to be of limited effectiveness anyway, will be saved; people 
in business will be better off, and so will people not in business.75 
I pointed out much earlier that whether behaviour is ethical 
depends, in the typical case, on the motivation. Helping others sim-
ply in order to win a good reputation or get them to vote for me does 
not show me to be kind. Paying the greengrocer for the potatoes 
instead of stealing them, simply because I am afraid of being caught 
and punished, does not show me to have much of a sense of justice. 
So surely we are now stuck with a different sort of problem: in 
explaining the importance of ethical behaviour for business, we have 
given people a reason to follow the policy of ethical behaviour, as the 
policeman beside me in the greengrocer's shop gives me a reason to 
follow the policy of honest behaviour, but we have not given people 
a reason to be ethical. I think we have, actually, and if the right 
moves are made then a situation will be created in which the unethi-
75 Or, at least, we might be better off. I hesitate to suggest that government would 
respond to this considerable drop in its outgoings by making cuts in taxation, 
but what they spent money on would be different and might be more pleasant 
for us all. 
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cal, while they will not become ethical, will have a reason to follow 
the policy of ethical behaviour. 
The remark that either you're ethical or you're not has point to it; 
it is, in an important way, a truth. What I have been through is not a 
set of reasons for being ethical, but an explanation of some of the 
ways in which the ethical can go wrong. A business ethics course will 
not tum the unethical into ethical people, but it will help ethical 
people to be better and more effective at being ethical. Being ethical 
(not merely ethical behaviour as a policy, but genuinely being an 
ethical person) is, indeed, likely to pay off in business, 76 and that 
does not detract from the ethical character of those people.77 
If people behave in the way that ethical standards require simply 
because it pays to do so, then they will not do so when they can get 
away with an infringement. Certainly there are people who are just 
like that. But if that is the norm, and not merely an exceptional case, 
then the ethos becomes unethical behaviour and so does the practice, 
with trouble all around for business. What has to be done to correct 
this is to remove provocations to unethical behaviour as far as poss-
ible and to remove confusions about the ethics of business behaviour. 
The removal of confusions about the ethics of business behaviour 
has two aspects to it: some understanding of what goes on in busi-
ness, and an understanding of which predicates from personal mora-
lity carry over and apply in business behaviour and which do not. 78 
And, since what is at issue is the creation of an ethos that will pro-
duce a good ethic for business, it is the community of which that will 
be the ethos that needs the ethics education: all of us, and not merely 
those engaged in business. We have to be prepared to take responsi-
bility for ourselves as a democratic community instead of simply 
complaining about a lack of ethics and waiting for somebody else to 
do something about it. We have to be prepared to vote out corrupt 
governments that set a bad example, and, in order to do that, we 




See, for example, the arguments and examples in Mark Pastin: The Hard Prob-
lems of Management: Gaining the Ethics Edge (London: Jossey-Bass, 1986), passim. 
This is argued out in detail in R.E. Ewin: Virtues and Rights: The Moral Philo-
sophy of Thomas Hobbes (San Francisco and Oxford: Westview, 1991), chapter 7. 
So, to the question I raised earlier about who should teach ethics courses: not 
simply people who are experts in ethics, but people who know a lot about how 
business works and people who have some understanding of how ethical con-
cepts work and see the difference between personal morality and the less per-
sonal ethics of business or the professions. It is probably amongst philosophers 
that we should look for such people, though certainly not all of them, and not 
even all who describe themselves as moral philosophers, fit the requirements. 
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nerve and then complaining of the venality of others. What is the 
problem is not simply the lack of business ethics in business, as 
though business were entirely separate from the rest of life; it is the 
lack of business ethics, and the lack of reflectiveness about ethics in 
general, through the community as a whole. 
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